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Export Cartels: Is it Legal to Target Your Neighbour? 
Analysis in Light of Recent Case Law 
 
Marek Martyniszyn*
 
 
Abstract 
Despite the growing sophistication of antitrust regimes around the world, export cartels 
benefit from special treatment: they are almost universally tolerated, if not encouraged in the 
countries of origin. Economists do not offer an unambiguous policy recommendation on how 
to deal with them due in part to the lack of empirical data. This article discusses arguments 
for and against export cartels and it identifies the existing gaps in the present regulatory 
framework. The theoretical part is followed by an analysis of the recent case law: a US cartel 
challenged with different outcomes in India and South Africa, as well as Chinese export 
cartels pursued in the US. The Chinese cases are particularly topical as the conduct at stake, 
apart from being subject to private antitrust actions before US courts, was also challenged 
within the WTO dispute settlement framework, pointing out to the existing interface between 
trade and competition. While the recent developments prove that unaddressed issues tend not 
to vanish, the new South-North dimension has the potential of placing export cartels again on 
the international agenda. Pragmatic thinking suggests looking for the solution within the 
WTO framework. 
Disclaimer 
This is a post-print version of the article (not the published version itself). The final, edited version 
was published in 15(1) Journal of International Economic Law 181 (2012). It is available online at 
http://jiel.oxfordjournals.org/content/15/1/181.short  Please refer to and cite the published version. 
I. Introduction 
Antitrust laws
1
 remain predominantly national. International trade agreements address public 
restraints of trade and their relevance in the field of competition seems limited.
2
 The 
international regulatory regime governing competition is a patchwork of rules (different 
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1
 The terms antitrust, antitrust laws and competition law are used in this paper interchangeably. 
2
 Bilateral or regional trade agreements often include competition law provisions, but frequently such provisions 
are non-binding. See Anestis S. Papadopoulos, The International Dimension of EU Competition Law and Policy 
(Cambridge: CUP, 2010) 145-204; D. Daniel Sokol, 'Order without (Enforceable) Law: Why Countries Enter 
into Non-Enforceable Competition Policy Chapters in Free Trade Agreements', 83 Chicago-Kent Law Review 
231 (2008). 
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national substantive competition rules, different jurisdictional and procedural rules),
3
 coupled 
with various cooperation agreements
4
 and voluntary cooperation.
5
 Yet business activities are 
global.
6
 
In the last two decades competition authorities around the world invested considerable 
effort in the fight against transnational anticompetitive conduct focusing particularly on 
international cartels. This led to some impressive outcomes, such as in case of the vitamin 
cartel, when it was not only investigated in the US, but thanks to the cooperation between 
competition authorities it was also successfully challenged, for example, in the EU, Canada, 
                                                          
3
 Bhagwati talks about a ‘spaghetti bowl’ phenomenon in the context of crisscrossing preferential trade 
agreements, which rules on origin of products distort the incentives to invest purely on the economic efficiency 
grounds and make the global trading rules non-transparent. On this notion in the context of international trade 
agreements see Jagdish N. Bhagwati, Termites in the Trading System: How Preferential Agreements Undermine 
Free Trade (Oxford: OUP, 2008) 61-71. The rules governing the transnational anticompetitive conduct resemble 
such a spaghetti bowl. See generally Brendan J. Sweeney, The Internationalisation of Competition Rules 
(London: Routledge, 2010); David J. Gerber, Global Competition: Law, Markets, and Globalization (Oxford 
OUP, 2010). 
4
 For example bilateral cooperation agreements such as between US and, inter alia, Australia, Brazil, Canada, 
and the EU; for the full list with corresponding texts see http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/international/int-
arrangements.html (visited 7 January 2012); or the quaternary agreement between Denmark, Iceland, Norway 
and Sweden, allowing for exchange of confidential information (the agreement was originally tripartite, with 
Sweden acceding at the later stage), see http://www.norden.org/en/about-nordic-co-
operation/agreements/treaties-and-agreements/industry-trade/agreement-between-denmark-iceland-norway-and-
sweden-concerning-cooperation-in-matters-of-competition (visited 7 January 2012). See generally Bruno 
Zanettin, Cooperation Between Antitrust Agencies at the International Level (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2002). 
5
 The leading forum of voluntary cooperation in antitrust matters in the International Competition Network 
(ICN), a virtual network of 114 competition authorities, which also actively involves academics, practitioners 
and civil society groups. See http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/ (visited 7 January 2012), 
compare Andrea Gomes da Silva and Greg Olsen, 'Interview with John Fingleton, Chair of the Steering Group 
of the International Competition Network (ICN)', 25 Antitrust 71 (2010); Hugh M. Hollman and William E. 
Kovacic, 'The International Competition Network: Its Past, Current and Future Role', 20 Minnesota Journal of 
International Law 274 (2011). Apart from ICN, both Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) and United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) offer a forum for a voluntary 
cooperation in competition law and policy. These are both intergovernmental bodies: the former offers a 
perspective of developed economies and it has gained a particular expertise in peer reviews, whereas the latter is 
characterized by its focus on development and engagement in technical cooperation. See 
http://www.oecd.org/competition and http://www.unctad.org/Templates/StartPage.asp?intItemID=2068&lang=1 
(visited 7 January 2012). Compare D. Daniel Sokol, 'International Antitrust Institutions', in Andrew T. Guzman 
(ed), Cooperation, Comity, and Competition Policy (Oxford: OUP, 2011) 194-202. 
6
 KOF Index of Globalization and A.T. Kearney/Foreign Policy Globalization Index measure the growing 
interconnectedness from different perspectives, including its economic aspect. See 
http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/ and http://www.atkearney.com/index.php/Publications/globalization-index.html 
(visited 7 January 2012). 
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Australia, Korea, Brazil and Mexico.
7
 Despite such developments, little has been done to 
address the issue of export cartels,
8
 i.e. cartels affecting only foreign markets.  
The contribution of this paper is to identify the existing gaps in the present regulatory 
framework applicable to export cartels, as well as the challenges posed by their operations in 
the light of the recent case law. The issue of export cartels is being addressed from the 
competition law perspective, taking into consideration, where appropriate, an international 
trade dimension.  
This paper first summarizes what we know about export cartels, their functions and 
significance. It then sets outs the views of different states on export cartels, expressed within 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) framework. This then leads to an analysis of the legal 
framework applicable to export cartels, with particular regard to extraterritoriality as a 
unilateral tool available in addressing transnational anticompetitive conduct. The following 
part looks into recent cases, which point out to various limitations of and challenges faced by 
the current regulatory regime applicable to export cartels. The conclusions support a call for 
an international solution to the issue of export cartels in the WTO framework. 
II. Lacking Data and Argumentative Battle 
Export cartels are peculiar creatures: in most competition law regimes, if put into effect 
domestically, they would be considered illegal, whereas when implemented externally, in 
foreign jurisdictions, they are considered legal and tolerated (implicitly, as export cartels are 
simply not covered by domestic competition laws unless they produce domestic effects), if 
not encouraged, by the very same country of origin. Some consider their operations as ‘the 
                                                          
7
 Harry First, 'Vitamins Case: Cartel Prosecutions and the Coming of International Competition Law', 68 
Antitrust Law Journal 711 (2001), at 717-18; John M. Connor, Global Price Fixing, 2nd ed. (Heidelberg: 
Springer, 2008) 383-91. See also Simon J. Evenett, et al., 'International Cartel Enforcement: Lessons from the 
1990s', 24 The World Economy 1221 (2001). 
8
 Harding and Joshua define cartel as ‘an organization of independent enterprises from the same or similar area 
of economic activity, formed for the purpose of promoting economic interests by controlling competition 
between themselves.’ Similarly, the OECD Glossary defines cartel as a formal, mutually beneficial agreement 
among firms in an oligopolistic industry. It also explicitly acknowledges the existence of public cartels, 
established by government/s. Christopher Harding and Julian Joshua, Regulating Cartels in Europe, 2nd ed. 
(Oxford: OUP, 2010) 12; OECD, Glossary of Industrial Organisation Economics and Competition Law (1993), 
18-19, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/8/61/2376087.pdf (visited 7 January 2012). Accordingly, 
export cartels are cartels which focus only on foreign markets, not affecting directly markets in the jurisdictions 
where cartel members are located. Furthermore, export cartels can be divided into two groups: national export 
cartels (membership from the single competition law regime) or international export cartels (membership from 
different regimes). 
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most obvious sort of anticompetitive beggar-my-neighbour conduct’9 or ‘little more than an 
attempt to enhance domestic welfare at the expense of global welfare or the welfare of 
consumers in the target market in particular.’10 
Although there is a broad consensus against private international hard core cartels,
11
 
this category, as defined in the OECD Recommendation, does not include any type of export 
cartels.
12
 While, for example, Sweeney distinguishes between international and export 
cartels,
13
 this article takes a different approach and explicitly recognizes that export cartels 
may be both national or international in membership (for example Organization of the 
Petroleum Exporting Countries, OPEC).
14
 In case of the former group it may be argued that 
they pose little threat: so long as they do not control the world market of a particular good, 
they should face foreign competition. It may, but does not have to be so, as some national 
export cartels may have a low world market share, yet a high market share in a particular 
country or region.
15
 In any case this argument does not apply to international export cartels. 
Therefore there is no a priori reason why to disregard the issue of export cartels. 
Furthermore, export cartels do not have to be purely private agreements and there is, 
similarly, no reason why public, state-run export cartels should escape the scrutiny. 
It is acknowledged in the literature that empirical data on export cartels is lacking.
16
 
This state of affairs seriously handicaps attempts to analyze this issue. It may well be that the 
greatest significance of export cartels, as seen through the lens of free trade, is symbolic. The 
                                                          
9
 Eleanor M. Fox, 'Competition Law and the Millennium Round', 2 Journal of International Economic Law 665 
(1999), at 674. 
10
 Florian Becker, 'The Case of Export Cartel Exemptions: Between Competition and Protectionism', 3 Journal 
of Competition Law and Economics 97 (2007), at 115. 
11
 See, for example, Gal calls them ‘a primary evil of global trade’, extrapolating from the US Supreme Court 
who called a domestic cartel ‘the supreme evil of antitrust’. Verizon Communications v. Law Offices of Curtis V. 
Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 408 (2004); Michal S. Gal, 'Free Movement of Judgments: Increasing Deterrence of 
International Cartels Though Jurisdictional Reliance' (New York University School of Law Law & Economics 
Research Paper Series No. 08-44, 2008), 1, available at http://ssrn.com/paper=1291844 (visited 7 January 2012). 
Compare Margaret C. Levenstein and Valerie Y. Suslow, 'Contemporary International Cartels and Developing 
Countries: Economic Effects and Implications for Competition Policy', 71 Antitrust Law Journal 801 (2004); 
OECD, 'Hard Core Cartels Third Report on the Implementation of the 1998 OECD Recommendation', 8 OECD 
Journal of Competition Law and Policy 7 (2006). 
12
 OECD, Recommendation of the Council Concerning Effective Action Against Hard Core Cartels, 
C(98)35/FINAL (March 1998), para. I(A)2(b), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/39/4/2350130.pdf 
(visited 7 January 2012). 
13
 Brendan Sweeney, 'Export Cartels: Is there a Need for Global Rules?', 10 Journal of International Economic 
Law 87 (2007), at 90. 
14
 In similar vein Margaret C. Levenstein and Valerie Y. Suslow, 'Changing International Status of Export Cartel 
Exemptions', 20 American University International Law Review 785 (2005), at 788, n. 6. 
15
 See below note 35 and accompanying text. 
16
 See, for example, Becker, above n 10, at 116; D. Daniel Sokol, 'What do We Really Know About Export 
Cartels and What is the Appropriate Solution?', 4 Journal of Competition Law and Economics 967 (2008), at 
970-71.  
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principles underlying trade liberalization have been the antithesis of mercantilism, which is 
characterized by beggar-thy-neighbour policies. The fact of tolerance or even encouragement 
of export cartels may be seen, as Sweeney puts it, as a form of neo-mercantilism
17
 and thus 
contrary to the efforts of trade liberalisation. As the same time, Sokol rightly cautions that 
due to the lack of empirical data solutions to the issue of export cartels may be too reliant on 
theory with all the risks connected with the acceptance of various assumptions, which may be 
misguided.
18
 
Arguments in favour of export cartels are various, but not many. The first argument 
underlines the ‘enabling role’ of export cartels. It is argued that companies may create export 
cartels to jointly market products, enter new markets, or achieve sufficient scale to actively 
participate in world commerce.
19
 It is usually claimed in the context of small and medium 
size undertakings which, arguably, but for the export cartels would be unable to expand and 
successfully compete internationally. At the same time it is not clear if such firms actually 
organize export cartels.
20
 This argument is coupled with an efficiency claim. It is argued that 
export cartels may lead to efficiency gains, for example by conducting common sales 
activities, market research, negotiation of shipping rates etc. Those gains, in competitive 
markets, would lead to more competition in downstream market, which in turn would lead to 
lower prices.
21
 Therefore such agreements, although lessening competition among their 
participants, would not act to the detriment of consumers thanks to the efficiency gains.  
                                                          
17
 Sweeney, above n 13, at 96. 
18
 Sokol, above n 16, at 971.  
19
 Evenett, et al., above n 7, at 1233. 
20
 Becker, above n 10, at 116. For example Larson in his study of US Webb-Pomerene export cartels showed 
that in 1962 (granted a long time ago) 70 per cent of registered export cartels had no members who were small 
companies (i.e. firms holding assets worth $1 million or less). See David A. Larson, 'An Economic Analysis of 
the Webb-Pomerene Act', 13 Journal of Law and Economics 461 (1970), at 470. Waller, on the other hand, 
looked at entities registered under the Export Trading Company Act of 1982, which was legislated to further 
promote US exports and offered registered entities broader immunity than available under the Webb-Pomerene 
Act. He found that in the first years after its introduction this legislation was availed of almost exclusively by 
small export intermediaries and by trade associations focusing on a small group of products, markets, or 
industries. At the same time this program was met with little interest by US businesses and was deemed 
unsuccessful. As Waller notes there was little in the data suggesting that the ETC Act has caused any 
fundamental change in the role of small narrowly focused and specialized export intermediaries. See Spencer 
Weber Waller, 'The Failure of the Export Trading Company Program', 17 North Carolina Journal of 
International Law and Commercial Regulation 239 (1992), at 250-51; compare Spencer Weber Waller, Antitrust 
and American Business Abroad, 3rd ed. (St. Paul Minn.: West Group, 1997-2010) ch. 9. 
21
 Andrew R. Dick, 'Are Export Cartels Efficiency-Enhancing or Monopoly-Promoting' (University of 
California, Department of Economics Working Paper No. 601, 1990), 2, 13. See also Joel Davidow and Hal 
Shapiro, 'The Feasibility and Worth of a World Trade Organization Competition Agreement', 37 Journal of 
World Trade 49 (2003), at 67. 
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Another rationale is what Becker calls a ‘defence argument’.22 Export cartels are to 
facilitate exporting companies’ market access to foreign markets which suffer from restricted 
competition, allowing them to overcome barriers to entry. Exporters may be faced with non-
tariff barriers, accumulated market power, and other aspects of distorted competition making 
market access more difficult. Therefore the argument goes as follows: the foreign market is 
characterized by distorted competition and/ or non-tariff barriers, making it difficult to gain 
access for foreign companies. In such case creation of an export cartel, coordinating firms’ 
action, allows companies to overcome difficulties (for example to exercise countervailing 
power against foreign buyers cartels
23
), bringing new players to the market, creating more 
competition, and leading ultimately to increased efficiency.
24
 The issue whether export 
cartels promote competition in foreign markets as well as access to those markets depends on 
whether exporters are new entrants or not. If they are new entrants, there is some likelihood 
that this new entry is the outcome of cooperation.
25
 Export cartels facilitate market 
penetration in a very distinct set of conditions, i.e. when there are structural impediments to 
access in the targeted market. In other cases this argument does not apply.
26
  
Apart from the anti-cartel arguments valid for all types of cartels and concerning their 
ability to fix prices at supra-competitive levels or divide markets,
27
 there are some economic 
arguments that respond directly to the rationale offered in favour of export cartels. They 
particularly reflect upon the arguably benign effects of export cartels on domestic markets, 
i.e. domestic markets are not immune from the effect of export cartels. First of all, export 
cartels whose members have an important part of the domestic market can influence domestic 
supplies and prices by their export decisions.
28
 In other words, if a significant part of capacity 
until then engaged in supply of the domestic market is devoted to supply the export markets, 
the domestic output and prices will be affected. But it seems that the most important 
argument against the tolerance of export cartels, from the perspective of their home state, is 
                                                          
22
 Becker, above n 10, at 116. 
23
 James D. Whitney, 'The Causes and Consequences of Webb-Pomerene Associations: A Reappraisal', 38 
Antitrust Bulletin 395 (1993), at 398. 
24
 Compare Becker, above n 10, at 116. 
25
 In this vein ibid, at 117; Aditya Bhattacharjea, 'Export Cartels-A Developing Country Perspective', 38 Journal 
of World Trade 331 (2004), at 350. 
26
 Becker, above n 10, at 118. 
27
 See generally Loius Kaplow and Carl Shapiro, 'Antitrust', in A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell (eds), 
Handbook of Law and Economics (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2007) Vol. 2; Alexis Jacquemin and Margaet E. Slade, 
'Cartels, Collusion, and Horizontal Merger', in Richard Schmalensee and Robert D. Willig (eds), Handbook of 
Industrial Organization (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1989) Vol 1; George J. Stigler, 'A Theory of Oligopoly', 
72 The Journal of Political Economy 44 (1964). 
28
 Ulrich Immenga, 'Export Cartels and Voluntary Export Restraints between Trade and Competition Policy', 4 
Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal 93 (1995), at 125-26. 
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that there is a threat of expansion of export cartel operations to the domestic market.
29
 Their 
successful cooperation in foreign markets incentivizes companies to follow the same strategy 
at home. The fact of cooperation abroad, involving exchange of information concerning 
prices, costs, or other polices, leads to increased visibility between firms and it is likely to 
influence the domestic conduct of firms. Even if they do not organize a cartel on the domestic 
market, there is a possibility of conscious parallelism,
30
 otherwise known as tacit collusion. 
Without any explicit agreement with regard to their operation on the domestic market, firms 
having sufficient knowledge about each other, thanks to participation in export cartel, may 
behave in a similar way, as if there was a domestic cartel,
31
 and while subject to national 
competition laws successfully enforcing those laws against tacit collusions is very difficult. 
Bhattacharjea notes that when assessing the impact of an export cartel at the end of 
the day ‘it all depends’, and that a number of issues needs to be considered in each particular 
case, among them:
32
 (1) is the cartel a new entrant, (2) the nature of efficiencies claimed, (3) 
the market structure, (4) the degree of import penetration. Dick,
33
 while analysing the 
operations of US registered export cartels provides a useful general framework, 
distinguishing monopoly-promoting and efficiency-enhancing export cartels. He notes that 
the monopoly hypothesis (export cartels exercise market power, raise prices and lead to 
reduced exports, as firms export less in a cartel than when acting competitively
34
) is more 
plausible when cartels have a large share of the world market and face relatively disorganized 
buyers. At the same time, some export cartels while internationally not influential may have a 
significant share of particular markets. This can be an issue in case of former colonies, due to 
survival of trade patterns shaped in the past.
35
 The less competition a cartel faces in the 
targeted country, the greater its opportunity to exercise market power. In effect, the countries 
with less developed industries are more likely to suffer harm, than developed economies with 
                                                          
29
 Becker, above n 10, at 119. Schultz shows that export cartels may lead to anticompetitive effects on domestic 
market, at least when markets are not too different or in case of constant returns to scale. See Christian Schultz, 
'Export Cartels and Domestic Markets', 2 Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade 233 (2002). 
30
 OECD, Export Cartels. Report of the Committee of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices (Paris: OECD, 
1974) 50. 
31
 Compare OECD, above n 8, at 26-27; Reza Dibadj, 'Conscious Parallelism Revisited', 47 San Diego Law 
Review 589 (2010). 
32
 Bhattacharjea, above n 25, at 354. 
33
 See generally Dick, above n 21, 2-3. 
34
 Interestingly it seems that the hypothesis on reduced volumes of export is reflected in Canadian export cartels 
exemption, which does not apply if such a cartel ‘has resulted in or is likely to result in a reduction or limitation 
of the real value of exports of a product’, yet Canadian law does not require registration of export cartels. 
Competition Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-34, as amended, para. 45(5)(a). 
35
 Bhattacharjea, above n 25, at 348. See also James E. Rauch, 'Networks Versus Markets in International 
Trade', 48 Journal of International Economics 7 (1999). 
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competitive markets.
36
 Export cartels have greater incentives to enter non-competitive 
markets where there is greater scope for higher prices. The efficiency defence (export cartel 
lead to efficiency gains which are passed on to consumers via lower prices) is most likely 
when firms incur large fixed costs to operate abroad and their market share is relatively 
small.
37
  
The foregoing arguments for and against export cartels show that an unambiguous 
policy recommendation on how to handle them and a consensus among experts are lacking. 
Export cartels may or may not cause severe harm however the empirical data in that regard is 
missing and there is no reason to believe it may be collected, taking into consideration their 
predominantly secret character.
38
 At the same time there are valid arguments showing that in 
certain circumstances export cartels may be beneficial to consumers. As well as analysing 
export cartels from a law and economic perspective, regard also has to be had to institutional 
assessment in relation to national competition authorities’ capacity (legal instruments, 
expertise, budgets). While a case-by-case analysis of export cartels may be a favourable 
approach due to the unsettled economic stance, any proposed solution should take into 
account the actual capacity constraints of competition authorities in many developing and 
least-developed countries, which may not be able to evaluate individual cases or monitor the 
domestic effects of home-based export cartels. 
III. Discussion in the WTO Framework39 
In 1996 a WTO Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy 
has been set up to consider issues on the interface of trade and competition as part of 
                                                          
36
 Immenga, above n 28, at 126. 
37
 Dick, above n 21, 11. 
38
 The word ‘secret’ reflects the fact that even when domestically legal, export cartels have no incentive to mark 
their presence, as they could be subject to legal action in targeted jurisdictions. They are ‘predominantly’ secret, 
because some regimes grant their export cartels exemptions from the scope of national competition laws only 
after their notification/registration and require reporting. That is the case, for example, in the US under both the 
Webb-Pomerene Act of 1918 and the Export Trading Company Act of 1982; and in Australia under the Trade 
Practices Act of 1974, but unlike the US, where the information about the granted exemptions is published, the 
Australian competition authority is not permitted to disclose information about applications). Levenstein and 
Suslow, who analyzed export cartel exemptions in 55 regimes, marked a trend to elimination of explicit 
exemptions, noting the elimination of reporting requirements reduces the information available about export 
cartels. Levenstein and Suslow, above n 14, at 806-15. 
39
 It is worth pointing out that the International Competition Network (ICN) runs a ‘Cartel Group’, but the issue 
of export cartels has not been, until now, the focus of its attention. The documents of the ICN Cartel Group are 
available online at 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/library.aspx?search=&group=2&type=0&workshop=0 (visited 
7 January 2012). 
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discussions as to whether or not to include competition within the framework of the WTO.
40
 
Export cartels were discussed on a number of occasions, yet consensus was neither found on 
the issue of their significance, nor on a future regulatory approach.  
There was no common position among industrialized states. The EU (the European 
Community at that time
41
) explicitly considered export cartels as having distortionary effects 
on trade as well as a harmful impact on development.
42
 Japan recognized that export cartels 
distort trade and opted for their regulation, or even prohibition, within the WTO framework.
43
 
The US, who expressly allows export cartels, defended them recognizing an enabling and 
efficiency arguments. It pointed to the OECD Recommendation
44
 permitting members to 
exclude export cartels from cartel enforcement in a transparent manner
45
 and suggested 
exclusion from a definition of hardcore cartels for agreements having ‘a significant potential 
to enhance efficiency’. They underlined that export cartels may have procompetitive effects, 
allowing firms that hitherto did not engage in export activities to do so.
46
 Moreover, the US 
claimed that export cartels may bring innovation and lower prices, underlining that their 
prohibition or per se treatment would be inappropriate.
47
 
For developing countries, the clearest position on this issue was taken by Thailand, 
which called for abolition of export cartel exemptions in industrialized states. It considered 
                                                          
40
 The group has been set up as a result of the WTO Ministerial Conference in Singapore in 1996 ‘to study 
issues raised by Members relating to the interaction between trade and competition policy, including anti-
competitive practices, in order to identify any areas that may merit further consideration in the WTO 
framework’. Singapore Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(96)/DEC (13 December 1996), para. 20, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min96_e/wtodec_e.htm (visited 7 January 2012). It was active 
until mid-2003. For more on the history of the Working Group see 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/comp_e/history_e.htm (visited 7 January 2012). 
41
 The European Economic Community, established by the Treaty of Rome in 1957, was renamed by the Treaty 
on the European Union (Treaty of Maastricht), in 1993, as the European Community. The European Union was 
established as an overarching framework over the European Community, the European Coal and Steel 
Community and the Euratom, yet it itself lacked legal personality and it was the European Community who had 
the capacity to enter into international agreements. The recent Lisbon Treaty, amending the Treaties of 
Maastricht and Rome (the latter was also renamed to Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, TFEU), 
which entered into force in December 2009, changed this situation and the legal personality was explicitly 
granted to the European Union, which replaced and succeeded the Community. See Alina Kaczorowska, 
European Union Law, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge-Cavendish, 2010) 1-38. Furthermore, in accordance with 
Art. 207 of the TFEU the trade policy is the competence of the EU and the European Commission representative 
speaks on the WTO forum on behalf of the EU, which is itself also a member of the WTO, and its member 
states. Compare http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/eu-and-wto/working-with-the-wto/ (visited 7 
January 2012). 
42
 Report of the Meeting of 2-3 October 2000, WT/WGTCP/M/12 (8 November 2000), para. 67. 
43
 Communication from Japan, WT/WGTCP/W/156 (19 December 2000), para. 4. 
44
 OECD, above n 12. 
45
 Communication from the United States, WT/WGTCP/W/203 (15 August 2002), paras 7-8. 
46
 Report on the Meeting of 1-2 July 2002, WT/WGTCP/M/18 (20 September 2002), para. 44. 
47
 Report on the Meeting of 20-21 February 2003, WT/WGTCP/M/21 (26 May 2003), para. 37. 
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‘the use of export cartels as a strategic trade policy to extract "rents" from foreign countries is 
unacceptable’.48 Furthermore, it recognized export cartels as ‘potentially damaging’ to 
developing countries’ economies, in terms of worsening their terms of trade.49 At the same 
time as an expression of special and differential treatment,
50
 Thailand argued that developing 
countries should be allowed to exempt domestic and international export cartels. The 
suggested rationale was the need to allow ‘mainly small scale’ importers and exporters in 
those countries to gain countervailing power against buyers or sellers from developed 
countries.
51
 The Thai proposal was supported by Indonesia
52
 and China. The latter also 
recognized that maintenance of export cartels exemptions in the competition laws of 
developed states would further disadvantage developing countries.
53
 In a similar way, 
UNCTAD suggested that developed countries should abolish export cartels exemptions on a 
non-reciprocal basis.
54
 Later the Thai position somewhat softened, calling for at least a case-
by-case approach instead of a prohibition.
55
 It is noteworthy that Brazil cautioned about 
export cartels exemptions, which it considered ‘tantamount to a licence to hurt other 
economies’, especially developing countries, without calling for special exception for the 
latter group.
56
  
The developing countries were reluctant in opt in to an agreement on competition, 
afraid of high compliance costs and little actual benefits.
57
 In fact a few days before the 
Cancun Ministerial Conference in 2003, in a common submission they opposed the lack of 
consideration of their views on competition and other so-called Singapore issues
58
 in the draft 
                                                          
48
 Communication from Thailand, WT/WGTCP/W/213/Rev.1 (26 September 2002), para. 2.1. 
49
 Ibid.  
50
 The special and differential treatment (SDT) is a WTO term describing special right granted developing 
countries, for example preferential market access, greater freedom to use trade policies otherwise prohibited, 
limited reciprocity in trade negotiations, transition periods with regard to implementation of some obligations. 
For more on SDT see Bernard Hoekman, 'Operationalizing the Concept of Policy Space in the WTO: Beyond 
Special and Differential Treatment', 8 Journal of International Economic Law 405 (2005); Sheila Page and Peter 
Kleen, 'Special and Differential Treatment of Developing Countries in the World Trade Organization', Swedish 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs Global Development Studies 2 (2005), available at 
http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/details.asp?id=2445&title=special-differential-treatment-developing-countries-
world-trade-organization (visited 7 January 2012). 
51
 Communication from Thailand, above n 48, para. 5. 
52
 Report on the Meeting of 26-27 September 2002, WT/WGTCP/M/19 (15 November 2002), para. 53. 
53
 Communication from China, WT/WGTCP/W/241 (25 July 2003), para. 6. 
54
 Communication from UNCTAD, WT/WGTCP/W/197 (15 August 2002), paras 50, 53, 72. 
55
 Report on the Meeting of 20-21 February 2003, above n 47, at para 44. 
56
 Report on the Meeting of 26-27 May 2003, WT/WGTCP/M/22 (9 July 2003), para. 111. 
57
 In this vein Aditya Bhattacharjea, 'The Case for a Multilateral Agreement on Competition Policy: A 
Developing Country Perspective', 9 Journal of International Economic Law 293 (2006), at 297. 
58
 At the 1996 Ministerial Conference in Singapore the WTO members decided to set up three working groups 
on trade and competition, trade and investment, and on transparency in government procurement. They also 
instructed the WTO General Council, the highest decision making body of the WTO, to look into the possible 
10 
 
of the Ministerial Declaration. They raised key questions, among them: whether the definition 
of hardcore cartels will include export cartels, what would be the scope of exemptions from 
the general prohibition of the former, and whether intergovernmental arrangements are to fall 
under the definition of hardcore cartels.
59
 The deadlock of negotiations during the Cancun 
Ministerial Conference led to the negotiation of the so-called ‘July 2004 package’. In this 
framework the WTO General Council decided that the issue of competition policy ‘will not 
form part of the Work Programme set out in that Declaration and therefore no work towards 
negotiations on any of these issues will take place within the WTO during the Doha 
Round’,60 and the Working Group became inactive. 
IV. Present Legal Framework  
Virtually all jurisdictions permit export cartels,
61
 either explicitly, requiring prior notification 
and/ or registration, or implicitly, by limiting cartels prohibition to those affecting domestic 
markets only. If the care for national welfare is the objective of national competition laws, 
then, at least in the short turn,
62
 export cartels positively contribute to the national economy, 
as they extract surplus from foreign consumers and transfer it into the profits of home based 
companies.
63
 Some of the explicit exemptions are motivated by mercantilism, a willingness to 
give national companies an extra competitive advantage.
64
 Hoekman and Saggi claim that it 
is the ‘sole purpose’ of the still legal status of export cartels.65 
The means by which export cartels remain legal in the state of origin matter. The 
more common implicit exemption deprives the home state of the possibility to monitor 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
ways of simplifying trade procedures, so-called trade facilitation. These four issues were later referred to as the 
Singapore issues. For broader discussion see Simon J. Evenett, 'Five Hypotheses Concerning the Fate of the 
Singapore Issues in the Doha Round', 23 Oxford Review of Economic Policy 392 (2007). 
59
 Communication from Bangladesh (on behalf of the LDC Group), Botswana, China, Cuba, Egypt, India, 
Indonesia, Kenya, Malaysia, Nigeria, Philippines, Tanzania, Uganda, Venezuela, Zambia and Zimbabwe, 
WT/MIN(3)/W/4 (4 September 2003), 2nd Annex, para. 3. 
60
 Decision Adopted by the General Council on 1 August 2004, WT/L/579 (2 August 2004), para. 1(g). See also 
Josef Drexl, 'International Competition Policy after Cancun', 27 World Competition 419 (2006). 
61
 Levenstein and Suslow who examined status of export cartels exemptions in fifty five jurisdictions, found no 
such exemption in four of them (Luxembourg, Russia, Thailand and Uruguay). Compare Levenstein and 
Suslow, above n 14, at 819-20. Fried reporting on this issue to the Inter-American Juridical Committee of the 
Organization of American States was unable to identify any jurisdiction prohibiting them. See Jonathan Fried, 
Cartels and Competition Law in the Americas: Hard Core and Export Cartels, CJI/doc.102/02 (2002), 90, 
available at http://www.oas.org/cji/eng/infoanual.cji.2002.ing.pdf (visited 7 January 2012). 
62
 Fox and Odrover note that beyond the short run their operations may lead to various retaliatory measures. 
63
 Eleanor M. Fox and Janusz A. Ordover, 'The Harmonization of Competition and Trade Law: the Case for 
Modest Linkages of Law and Limits to Parochial State Action', 19 World Competition 5 (1995), at 14-15. 
64
 Evenett, et al., above n 7, at 1230. 
65
 Bernard Hoekman and Kamal Saggi, 'Tariff Bindings and Bilateral Cooperation on Export Cartels', 83 Journal 
of Development Economics 141 (2007), at 142. 
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possible efficiency gains, and makes it difficult to scrutinize any spillover effects on the 
domestic market.
66
 At the same time, the lack of any registration requirement in the state of 
origin makes it more difficult for export cartels’ competitors or even competition authorities 
in targeted states to discover cartel operations. In this sense, explicit exemptions and 
registration requirements provide some transparency. They allow competitors or targeted 
states to react if needed. Also national competition authorities benefit from the possibility of 
oversight to make sure that the companies engaged in an export cartel do not try to act in an 
anticompetitive way domestically, or that their activities do not have spillover effects on 
domestic markets.
67
  
Until now the international community has not developed international rules or 
mechanisms addressing cartels, including export cartels.
68
 There is no international forum 
authorized to work towards a legally binding compromise or common rules in this regard. 
The WTO is without a mandate to deal with such issues, although in cases of state-related 
export cartels there is a possibility of triggering the WTO dispute settlement framework in at 
least three circumstances. First, Article XI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT)
69
 prohibits WTO members imposing or maintaining import and export restrictions. 
The Panel report in Japan- Trade in Semi-Conductors,
70
 where it has been established that a 
governmental scheme restricting the exportation of goods below certain price falls under 
prohibition of Article XI:1.
71
 By corollary a state-endorsed export cartel where the parties 
                                                          
66
 Becker, above n 10, at 118. 
67
 Ibid, at 113. 
68
 Although there are some international soft-law instruments, see, for example, OECD; UNCTAD, Model Law 
on Competition. Substantive Possible Elements for a Competition Law, Commentaries and Alternative 
Approaches in Existing Legislations, TD/RBP/CONF.5/7/Rev.3 (2007). Note: the OECD Recommendation 
allows to exempt export cartels from the scope of prohibition. 
69
 WTO, The Legal Texts: the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (Cambridge: 
CUP, 1999) 423. 
70
 GATT Panel Report, Japan – Trade in Semi-Conductors, L/6309, adopted 4 May 1988, BISD 35S/116. 
71
 The case concerned an agreement between the US and Japan, in which Japan, in order to avoid antidumping 
investigation, agreed inter alia, to monitor export prices of semiconductors to the US, so as to restrict the 
exports below certain price. The panel found that although the monitoring procedure was only a non-binding 
administrative guidance, it discouraged exporters to sell at lower prices, and could be considered a 
‘governmental measure’ within the meaning of Article XI:1, if (1) ‘reasonable grounds exist to believe that the 
sufficient incentives or disincentive existed for non-mandatory measures to take effect’, and (2) ‘the operation 
of the measures to restrict export of semi-conductors at prices below company-specific costs was essentially 
dependent on Government action or intervention’. Ibid, at para. 109. Compare Merit E. Janow, 'What Role for 
Competition Policy in the WTO?' (2002), available at 
http://www.columbia.edu/~mj60/PDF/janow%20rorcam%20912.pdf (visited 7 January 2012); Claus-Dieter 
Ehlermann and Lothar Ehring, 'WTO Dispute Settlement and Competition Law: Views from the Perspective of 
the Appellate Body's Experience', 26 Fordham International Law Journal 1505 (2003). The Article VI of GATT 
and the Anti-Dumping Agreement form the WTO antidumping regime, which allows states affected by 
dumping, within the meaning of these provisions, to impose antidumping duties. The Article 18.1 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreements clarifies that no other action may be taken against dumping, apart from imposition of 
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agree prices may fall within Article XI:1. In China- Measures Related to the Exportation of 
Various Raw Materials Panel adopted such an approach.
72
 Second, Article 11.1(b) of the 
Agreement on Safeguards
73
 prohibits ordering, or encouraging voluntary export restraints. 
Export cartels with state involvement could fall into this category as well. Finally, within the 
WTO framework it is possible to bring a so-called non-violation complaint,
74
 alleging that 
some new laws or regulations introduced in a particular WTO member state (in this case 
organizing or sanctioning export cartels) nullify or impair the benefits of WTO 
membership.
75
 
Therefore, in principle, a government organizing or compelling export cartels might 
be found in breach of its WTO obligations.
76
 Yet, even if these provisions prove capable of 
addressing state involvement in export cartels, they do not address the issue of private export 
cartels. 
From the perspective of a targeted state, the only way to handle export cartels 
formally is to act unilaterally and apply national competition laws extraterritorially.
77
 
Extraterritoriality seems to be a phenomenon of particular relevance in antitrust. It gradually 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
antidumping duties. Agreement on the Implementation of Art. VI GATT (Anti-Dumping Agreement). WTO, at 
147. This issue was at stake in the Act of 1916 case, where the old US antitrust provision, providing for criminal 
prosecution and treble damages in certain cases of dumping, was successfully challenged (leading to its repeal) 
by the EU (then the EC) and Japan in the WTO. The Appellate Body, confirming the Panel finding of the US 
violation, noted that ‘(d)umping is always transnational price discrimination, but transnational price 
discrimination is not always dumping’, pointing out to the interplay and possible overlap between antitrust and 
international trade regime. See WTO Appellate Body Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, 
WT/DS136/AB/R, WT/DS162/AB/R, adopted 26 September 2000, DSR 2000:X, 4793, para. 133, n. 71. 
Compare Mitsuo Matsushita, 'Basic Principles of the WTO and the Role of Competition Policy', 3 Washington 
University Global Studies Law Review 363 (2004), at 371-73. 
72
 WTO Panel Report, China- Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials, WT/DS394/R, 
WT/DS395/R, WT/DS398/R, adopted 5 July 2011. For more on this case see below text accompanying notes 
192-201. Note that on appeal the Appellate Body, on procedural grounds, found the Panel findings moot and of 
no legal effects. See below text accompanying notes 202-205. 
73
 WTO, above n 69, at 275. 
74
 Art. XXIII:1(b) GATT, Art. XXIII General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). Ibid, at 286. 
75
 Matsushita, then the Member of the WTO Appellate Body, in a similar vein on this three possibilities of 
challenging state-related export cartels in the WTO, see Mitsuo Matsushita, 'The Intersection of Industrial 
Policy and Competition: The Japanese Experience', 72 Chicago-Kent Law Review 477 (1996), at 498-500. For 
the skeptical view with regard to the reliance on non-violation complaint see Chris Noonan, The Emerging 
Principles of International Competition Law (Oxford: OUP, 2008) 430-32.  
76
 Noonan, above n 75, at 418-20; Bernard Hoekman and Petros C. Mavroidis, 'Economic Development, 
Competition Policy and the World Trade Organization', 37 Journal of World Trade 1 (2003), at 13. 
77
 See generally Menno T. Kamminga, 'Extraterritoriality', in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed), The Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law, online ed. (OUP, 2010). In the context of antitrust see Eleanor M. 
Fox, 'Can we Solve the Antitrust Problems of Globalization by Extraterritoriality and Cooperation? Sufficiency 
and Legitimacy', 48 Antitrust Bulletin 355 (2003); Damien Geradin, et al., 'Extraterritoriality, Comity and 
Cooperation in EC Competition Law' (SSRN eLibrary 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1175003 
(visited 7 January 2012); Brendan Sweeney, 'Combating Foreign Anti-competitive Conduct: What Role for 
Extraterritorialism?', 8 Melbourne Journal of International Law 35 (2007). 
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earned its present practical paramount importance with the development of the effects 
doctrine. This jurisdictional theory, introduced first in the US in 1945,
78
 provides for 
prescriptive jurisdiction
79
 over foreign-based persons and their foreign conduct if economic 
effects are experienced on the domestic market. It is a valuable tool in the fight against 
foreign anticompetitive arrangements in the absence of any international framework. The 
acceptance of the effects doctrine as a jurisdictional basis has been a long process, with the 
international community and scholars being split as to its legality and normative force.
80
 
Nevertheless, various forms of effects doctrine have been introduced through legislation or 
jurisprudence in many jurisdictions,
81
 providing for its present broad recognition. 
                                                          
78
 United States v. Aluminium Company of America (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416 (2nd Cir. 1945). 
79
 The term ‘jurisdiction’ has various meanings under international law. In this context the Restatement in 
Section 401 distinguishes between prescriptive, adjudicative and enforcement jurisdiction. It defines jurisdiction 
to prescribe as a capacity ‘to make its law applicable to the activities, relations, or status of persons, or the 
interests of persons in things, whether by legislation, by executive act or order, by administrative rule or 
regulation, or by determination of a court. American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law (Thrid): Foreign 
Relations Law of the United States (St. Paul, Minn.: American Law Institute Publishers, 1987). Compare 
Michael Akehurst, 'Jurisdiction in International Law', 46 British Yearbook of International Law 145 (1973), at 
326-28; Andreas F. Lowenfeld, 'Public Law in the International Arena: Conflict of Laws, International Law and 
Some Suggestions for Their Interaction', 163 Recueil des Cours 311 (1979), at 326-28. 
80
 Recently the Group of 77 and China protested against extraterritoriality, by expressing: ‘their deep concern at 
the increased application of coercive economic measures and unilateral sanctions against developing countries, 
including the new attempts aimed at extraterritorial application of domestic law, despite the rejection by the vast 
majority of the international community and the adoption of several resolutions by the United Nations General 
Assembly that urged the adoption of urgent and effective measures to eliminate them.’ UNCTAD, 
Communication from the Group of 77 and China Regarding the Application of Coercive Economic Measures 
and Unilateral Sanctions Against Developing Countries, TD/411 (2004), available at 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/td411_en.pdf (visited 7 January 2012). Group of 77 is an intergovernmental 
organization established by seventy seven developing states in 1964, as of January 2012 it comprises 132 states. 
It usually acts and takes positions together with China. See http://www.g77.org/ (visited 7 January 2012). Van 
Gerven commenting on the implementation doctrine (the EU jurisdictional basis for extraterritoriality analogous 
to the US effects doctrine, but more limited in its reach; triggered by a sale within the EU, irrespective of the 
location of a firm) noted that ‘[a sale] does not constitute a sufficiently close and relevant link with the 
regulating State that is compelling enough to justify jurisdiction on its part.’ Walter van Gerven, 'EC Jurisdiction 
in Antitrust Matters: The Wood Pulp Judgment', Fordham Corporate Law Institute 451 (1989), at 470. Compare 
D. Geradin, et al., 'Extraterritoriality, Comity and Cooperation in EC Competition Law', in Andrew T. Guzman 
(ed), Cooperation, Comity, and Competition Policy (Oxford: OUP, 2011). 
81
 Art. 2(2) of the Chinese competition law makes the law applicable ‘to the conducts outside the territory of the 
People's Republic of China if they eliminate or have restrictive effect on competition on the domestic market of 
the PRC.’ Anti-Monopoly Law of the People's Republic of China (2007), available at 
http://www.china.org.cn/government/laws/2009-02/10/content_17254169.htm (visited 7 January 2012). 
Similarly, Art. 2 of Brazilian antitrust law makes the law applicable ‘to acts wholly or partially performed 
within the Brazilian territory, or the effects of which are or may be suffered therein.’ Law 8884, Official Gazette 
of the Federal Executive of June 13 (1994), available at http://www.cade.gov.br/english/internacional/Law-
8884-1994b.pdf (visited 7 January 2012). In Australia the 2009 amendment to the competition law extended the 
reach of the Act to agreements containing a provision which ‘have the purpose, or has or is likely to have the 
effect, of directly or indirectly’ lessening competition, making it applicable to foreign parties with no presence 
or business activities in Australia. Competition and Consumer Act 2010, Act No. 51 of 1974 as amended, 
compare Jackie Mortensen, 'Extending the Extraterritorial Reach of the Trade Practices Act', 614 Australian 
Trade Practices News 1 (2009). 
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Extraterritoriality is potentially a powerful instrument, yet it suffers from various 
limitations and may not be, for practical reasons, available to all states. This is particularly so 
in case of developing and least-developed states. Even if they are in principle equipped with 
competition laws,
 
and this is not always the case,
82
 such laws need to be coupled with 
necessary capacity and resources to be effectively enforced.
 83
 Even if the preconditions are 
fulfilled, in transnational cases the evidence lies most likely abroad.
84
 Assuming that 
evidence is not an issue (a very theoretical assumption), there may be simply no scope for 
enforcement. Laws may prove in such cases toothless, as the assets of the parties involved 
may be based abroad, and as markets of such states often matter little, investment- and sales-
wise, the fined companies may decide to abandon the market instead of paying the penalties 
or damages. Backer calls it an enforcement asymmetry.
85
 Fox talks about ‘practical 
disenfranchisement of victim jurisdictions that lack resources and are vulnerable’.86 Hawk 
uses the phrase ‘enforcement lacuna’.87 This issue concerns not only developing countries, 
but also, for example, small and remote jurisdictions,
88
 which may lack the commercial 
importance or political power necessary to make extraterritoriality work in practice.
89
 
                                                          
82
 More than a hundred states adopted competition laws. International Bar Association Global Competition 
Forum provides an online database of competition laws around the world (listing also states without such 
provisions). See http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/ (visited 7 January 2012). 
83
 The practical value of having a competition regime and the challenges faced in its operation from the 
perspective of developing countries are analyzed by Jenny: Frederic Jenny, 'Cartels and Collusion in Developing 
Countries Lessons from Empirical Evidence', 29 World Competition 109 (2006). Compare Maher M. Dabbah, 
'Competition Law and Policy in Developing Countries: A Critical Assessment of the Challenges to Establishing 
an Effective Competition Law Regime', 33 World Competition 457 (2010); Eleanor M. Fox, 'Economic 
Development, Poverty, and Antitrust: The Other Path', 13 Southwestern Journal of Law and Trade in the 
Americas 211 (2007). For more on capacity constraints in the European context see Imelda Maher, 'Networking 
Competition Authorities in the European Union: Diversity and Change', in Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and Isabela 
Atanasiu (eds), European Competition Law Annual 2002: Constructing The EU Network Of Competition 
Authorities (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004) 223-36. 
84
 More on the issue of gathering evidence located abroad see Noonan, above n 75, at 517-34; Sweeney, above n 
3, at 251-62. 
85
 Becker, above n 10, at 111-12. See also Sokol, above n 16, at 974. 
86
 Eleanor M. Fox, 'Antitrust without Borders. From Roots to Codes to Networks', in Andrew T. Guzman (ed), 
Cooperation, Comity, and Competition Policy (Oxford: OUP, 2011) 274. 
87
 Hawk notes in the context of developing countries that ‘predatory cartels composed of foreign producers may 
be more frequent in developing countries where local cartel bans may be inadequate and home country bans are 
inapplicable.’ Compare Barry E. Hawk, 'International Antitrust Policy and the 1982 Acts: The Continuing Need 
for Reassessment', 51 Fordham Law Review 201 (1982), at 248. 
88
 Compare Michal S. Gal, 'Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust- The Case of a Small Economy: Israel', in 
Andrew T. Guzman (ed), Cooperation, Comity, and Competition Policy (Oxford: OUP, 2011) 97-120; Michal S. 
Gal, 'The Effects of Smallness and Remoteness on Competition Law - The Case of New Zealand', 14 
Competition & Consumer Law Journal 292 (2007). 
89
 The African proverb ‘Speak softly and carry a big stick, you will go far’ associated with US President 
Roosevelt foreign policy seems to adequately characterize extraterritoriality, where the judicial process plays the 
role of the soft speech and the economic or political importance does the work of the big stick. When the latter 
is missing, the former stops being effective. 
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Even in the case of states with well-developed antitrust regimes, necessary resources 
and various cooperation agreements in the field of enforcement, extraterritoriality
90
 may be 
obstructed by state-related avoidance techniques.
91
 Depending on the scope of a state 
involvement in the challenged conduct, the effort of bringing a foreign export cartel to a court 
may be either blocked on the jurisdictional level (principle of nonjusticiability / political 
question doctrine, the foreign state immunity doctrine), or significantly hindered by the 
available defences on merits (the act of state doctrine, foreign state compulsion).
92
 The 
bulwark of ‘sovereignty’ severely impedes the possibility of relying on extraterritoriality in 
transnational antitrust litigation involving or implicating foreign states. This is particularly so 
in cases concerning exploitation and exportation of natural resources, which traditionally 
have been seen as falling within the state domain.
93
 
The existence of export cartels exemplifies a gap in the present regulatory framework, 
which is ill-equipped to handle such foreign anticompetitive challenges.
94
 What seems to be 
lacking it a ‘cosmopolitan conception’95 which would allow a refocus of national competition 
laws from national to global welfare, taking into consideration foreign (outbound) 
consequences of domestic anticompetitive agreements.
96
 Against this backdrop, the present 
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 Some jurisdictions, especially the US, apart from prescriptive jurisdiction require their courts to establish 
personal jurisdiction over defendants. They demand an adequate nexus between the court’s territorial 
jurisdiction and the defendant. In the US this issue it intertwined with the due process requirement as provided 
under 5
th
 and 14
th
 Amendments to the federal Constitution. Therefore the reach of the prescriptive jurisdiction 
may be limited by the scope of personal jurisdiction. See Mark R. Joelson, An International Antitrust Primer: a 
Guide to the Operation of United States, European Union, and Other Key Competition Laws in the Global 
Economy, 3rd ed. (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2006) 87-90; Gary Born, International Civil 
Litigation in United States Courts: Commentary & Materials, 3rd ed. (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 
1996) 67-78. 
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 Spencer Weber Waller, et al., Special Defenses in International Antitrust Litigation (Chicago: ABA Antitrust 
Section, 1995); Marek Martyniszyn, 'Avoidance Techniques: State Related Defences in International Antitrust 
Cases' (CCP Working Paper No. 11-2, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1782888 (visited 7 January 
2012). 
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 In case of Australia the reliance on extraterritoriality in actions for damages is not automatic, but requires 
(under Section 5(3) of Competition and Consumer Act 2010) a prior ministerial consent. The Minister is 
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authorized by the law of the state in which it took place and the consent would not be in the national interests. 
Therefore a case against a foreign export cartel involving important Australian trade partner may not be at all 
possible in this jurisdiction. See Competition and Consumer Act 2010; Australian Government- The Treasury, 
'Guidance on Obtaining Ministerial Consent to Rely on Extraterritorial Conduct in Private Proceedings', January 
1, 2011 2011, available at http://www.treasury.gov.au/documents/1929/PDF/Guidance.pdf (visited 7 January 
2012), compare OECD, 'Competition Policy in Australia', 2010, para. 3.3.1, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/63/61/44529918.pdf (visited 7 January 2012). 
93
 See generally Nico J. Schrijver, 'Natural Resources, Permanent Sovereignty over', in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed), 
The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, online ed. (OUP, 2010). 
94
 In a similar vein Fox, above n 86, at 274; Eleanor M. Fox, 'International Antitrust and the Doha Dome ', 43 
Virginia Journal of International Law 911 (2003), at 919. 
95
 Fox, above n 77, at 366. 
96
 Fox and Ordover, above n 63, at 19-20; Drexl, above n 60, at 431. 
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legal status of export cartels gives the impression they are a living reminiscence of beggar-
thy-neighbour policies
97
 and remain a challenge for targeted jurisdictions.  
V. Case Studies 
This section outlines a few examples of cases where export cartels were challenged by 
extraterritorial application of competition laws in targeted states. It is not an analysis of a 
statistically representative sample, but rather an effort to partly fill in the empirical gap and 
better inform the discussion on export cartels by presentation of recent and still little-known 
case law. These cases, while involving different contexts, point out to various problems 
involved in attempts of unilaterally addressing export cartels. They present both the North-
South and South-North dimensions.
98
 First two cases deal with the same American soda ash 
export cartel, which was challenged, inter alia, in India and in South Africa. Both 
jurisdictions attempted to apply their competition laws extraterritorially, with very different 
outcomes. In India the case against the cartel failed. The Indian Supreme Court rejected, on a 
textual basis, the possibility of extraterritorial application of domestic competition law. 
Furthermore, the US government brought to play considerable political pressure while the 
case was awaiting decision. In South Africa the competition authority had the legal capacity 
to apply its law extraterritorially. The prolonged litigation ended with a settlement, according 
to which the cartel paid a considerable fine and withdrew from the market. From the 
perspective of antitrust enforcement: a success story. 
The three cases that follow offer the South-North perspective: Chinese export cartels 
affecting markets in the US. In these three recent cases defendants are generally (sometimes 
their status is unclear) state-owned enterprises and there is a considerable state involvement, 
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 Wunderlich and Warrier describe beggar-thy-neighbour policies as ‘strategic economic policies that are 
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other countries’. Jens-Uwe Wunderlich and Meera Warrier, A Dictionary of Globalization (London: Taylor and 
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involved in trade into Ireland, other changed their by-laws or informed that they had disbanded. The Authority 
had concerns only with regard to one cartel. Yet the change of the leadership of the Authority led to the 
reorientation of its focus and it seems that the issue was not followed up. Compare The Competition Authority, 
'2004 Annual Report', 2004, 12, available at 
http://www.tca.ie/images/uploaded/documents/annualreport2004.pdf (visited 7 January 2012); Colm Keena, 
'Competition Body Investigates US Group over Possible Cartel Activity', The Irish Times, 19 March 2005. 
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with the Chinese government actively supporting or forcing cartel creation and its operations. 
Although none of these cases has been settled yet, they raise a number of issues in the context 
of challenging transnational anticompetitive conduct with a foreign state involvement. 
Moreover, they point out to the interrelated trade dimension, as the conduct at stake was also 
challenged within the WTO framework, providing new dynamics into the issue of export 
cartels. 
A. American soda ash export cartel cases 
The American Soda Ash Export Cartel (ANSAC), an export cartel established in 1984 and 
registered under Webb-Pomerene Act,
99
 faced legal action for its anticompetitive conduct in 
various jurisdictions. After the European Commission found ANSAC had breached EU 
competition law by price fixing in 1990,
100
 ANSAC members organized another export 
association for the sake of exports to the EU, which focuses only on logistics related 
activities.
101
 More recently, ANSAC was accused of price-fixing in India and in South 
Africa.
102
 This section analyzes these two cases. 
1. The Indian case: A tale with a dramatic punchline 
In 1996 the Alkali Manufacturers Association of India (AMAI), which represents major 
producers of soda ash in India filed a complaint and applied for a temporary injunction (to 
stop imports) with the Indian antitrust authority, the MRTP Commission, against ANSAC for 
various infringements of the competition law. The applicable law was then the Monopoly and 
Restrictive Trade Practice Act of 1969 (the MRTP Act).
103
 In essence ANSAC, who 
attempted to enter Indian market for the first time, was accused of predatory pricing (selling 
below the costs). ANSAC, allegedly to circumvent Indian competition law tried to sell its 
products indirectly via a Singaporean entity. In response to the AMAI action, the 
                                                          
99
 The Webb-Pomerene Act provides for an exemption for US export trade associations, ergo export cartels, 
from domestic antitrust law. See Wilbur L. Fugate, 'The Export Trade Exception to the Antitrust Laws: The Old 
Webb-Pomerene Act and the New Export Trading Company Act', 15 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 
673 (1982). For the listing and fillings of the registered entities under the Webb-Pomerene Act see 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/statutes/webbpomerene/index.shtm (visited 7 January 2012). 
100
 European Commission, 91/301/EEC, Decision of 19 December 1990 relating to a Proceeding under Article 
85(1) of the EEC Treaty, IV/33.016- Ansac, OJ L152 54-60 (1991). 
101
 See below text accompanying notes 141-142. 
102
 ANSAC was also fund abusing dominant position in Venezuela. See Ignacio de León, An Institutional 
Assessment of Antitrust Policy: the Latin American Experience (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International 
2009) 371-72. Bhattacharjea, also writing on export cartels, looked into ANSAC cases in the EU, South Africa, 
India and Venezuela. Compare Bhattacharjea, above n 25. 
103
 The Monopolies And Restrictive Trade Practices Act, No. 54 of 1969, 27 December 1969, later replaced. See 
below note 116. 
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Commission instituted an inquiry and ordered an ex patre interim injunction against 
ANSAC
104
 in accordance with section 12A,
105
 on the basis of a prima facie view that ANSAC 
was engaged in restrictive trade practices.
106
 In 1997 the Commission rejected ANSAC’s 
petition for vacating the injunction. It based its jurisdiction on the section 14
107
 claiming that 
the ANSAC was carrying out part of its activities in India.
108
 In 2000 the Commission upheld 
the injunction and dismissed the ANSAC new argument that the case concerned dumping and 
therefore the Commission did not have jurisdiction.
109
 
The case was appealed to the Supreme Court,
110
 which found that the MRTP Act 
conferred no extraterritorial jurisdiction.
111
 Under the textual interpretation adopted by the 
court jurisdiction existed only after importation of the goods, while in this case the goods 
were only intended to be imported. Moreover, at least one of the parties involved in the 
                                                          
104
 Alkali Manufacturers Association of India v. American Natural Soda Ash Corporation & Others, Order from 
September 9, 1996 (1998) 3 CompLJ 173 MRTPC. 
105
 Section 12A(1) allowed for temporary injunction ‘where during an inquiry before the Commission, it is 
proved (…) that any undertaking or any person is carrying on, or is about to carry on (…) unfair, trade practice 
and such (…) practice is likely to affect prejudicially the public interest or the interest of any trader (…) or of 
any consumer or consumers generally (…).’ Section 37 of the MRTP Act allowed the Commission to 
investigate and prohibit any restrictive trade practice (RTP) after funding it ‘prejudicial to the public interest’. 
Section 38, on the other hand, provided a presumption, considering RTPs prejudicial to the public interest if not 
justified under so-called ‘gateways’, a list of defenses under section 38, which were not investigated in this case. 
106
 In the injunction the Commission referred to section 33, which defined ‘Registrable agreements relating to 
restrictive trade practice’, classifying the conduct as falling under section 33(1)(j): ‘any agreement to sell goods 
at such prices as would have the effect of eliminating competition or a competitor’. Later it seems to have 
reclassified the conduct into falling under section 33(1)(d) ‘any agreement to purchase or sell goods or to tender 
for the sale or purchase of goods only at prices or on terms or conditions agreed upon between the sellers or 
purchasers’. 
107
 Section 14 ‘Orders where party concerned does not carry on business in India: Where any practice 
substantially falls within [monopolistic, restrictive, or unfair, trade practice, relating to the production, storage, 
supply] distribution or control of goods of any description or the provision of any services and any party to such 
practice does not carry on business in India, an order may be made under this Act with respect to that part of the 
practices which is carried on in India.’ 
108
 The Commission analyzed the intricacies of the planned transaction and found the there was a sufficient 
nexus between the Indian consumers and ANSAC. There was business correspondence between some of the 
Indian consumers and ANSAC quoting a specific price of soda ash, which was reflected in letters of credit 
opened by Indians producers in favour of the Singaporean entity (which ANSAC used arguable in 
circumvention of Indian law) in an Indian bank. Moreover, there was a bill of lading indicating a port in the US 
as a port of loading and an Indian port as a port of discharge. Alkali Manufacturers Association of India v. 
American Natural Soda Ash Corporation & Others, Order from June 10, 1997 (1998) 3 CompLJ 152 MRTPC. 
109
 Aditya Bhattacharjea, 'Predation, Protection and the 'Public Interest'', 35 Economic and Political Weekly 
4327 (2000), at 4329. Bhattacharjea points out also another issue in the backdrop of this case: a possible 
existence of a domestic cartel of soda ash producers on the Indian market. See ibid, at 4328-29. 
110
 Haridas Exports v. All India Float Glass Manufacturers' Assn., 6 SCC 600 (The Supreme Court 2002). 
111
 Section 14 ‘Orders where party concerned does not carry on business in India’ of the MRTP Act: 
Where any practice substantially falls within [monopolistic, restrictive or unfair, trade practice, relating to the 
production, storage, supply, (Ins. by Act 58 of 1991, sec. 7)] distribution or control of goods of any description 
or the provision of any services and any party to such practice does not carry on business in India, an order may 
be made under this Act with respect to that part of the practices which is carried on in India.’ For more on the 
issue of extraterritoriality in antitrust and its limitations see above text accompanying notes 77-89. 
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anticompetitive conduct have to be carrying out business in India.
112
 Therefore it can be 
argued that the Supreme Court could have interpreted the law in a different way, finding 
ANSAC within the Commission’s jurisdiction. The lack of explicit, textual basis providing 
for extraterritorial jurisidciton in competition law exposed therefore India to 
vulnerability.The issue at stake was found beyond India’s competition law jurisdictional 
reach and ANSAC won the appeal.
113
 
The appeal was heard along with an appeal in another case, dealing with Indonesian 
manufacturers and exporters of float glass, raising similar issues of extraterritorial application 
of Indian competition law. In this context the court addressed the issue of the interface of 
competition and anti-dumping law. The firms argued that Art. 18.1 of the WTO Anti-
Dumping Agreement,
114
 to which India is a signatory, precludes the Commission’s 
jurisdiction in a case involving predatory pricing. The court considered the jurisdiction of the 
Commission not to be ‘ousted’ by the national legislation implementing the Anti-dumping 
Agreement and noted that both sets of rules, on anti-dumping and competition, ‘operate in 
different and distinct spheres.’115 It recognized that the anti-dumping and competition rules 
serve different purposes and are administered in a different way.
116
 The MRTP Act was later 
replaced with the Competition Act of 2002, which explicitly provides for extraterritorial 
jurisdiction in antitrust cases.
117
 
After ANSAC was banned from importing to India, it started lobbying for its case in 
the US and placed an official complaint with the US Trade Representative (USTR), arguing 
that India ‘failed to provide the US equitable and reasonable access’ to its market.118 This 
issue was discussed between the Indian Minister of Commerce and Industry and the US 
                                                          
112
 Haridas Exports v. All India Float Glass Manufacturers' Assn., above n 110, at 10-14. 
113
 Ibid, at 10. The court noted as well that a temporary injunction could be issued only after it is proved that the 
respondents are carrying or are about to carry on a restrictive trade practice which will be prejudicial to the 
public interest or to the interest of traders. Ibid, at 18-19. 
114
 Art. 18.1: ‘No specific action against dumping of exports from another Member can be taken except in 
accordance with the provisions of GATT 1994, as interpreted by this Agreement.’ 
115
 Haridas Exports v. All India Float Glass Manufacturers' Assn., above n 110, at 14.  
116
 Ibid. Compare Bimal N. Patel, India and International Law (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2008) 44-45.  
117
 Section 32 of the Competition Act of 2002 provides for extraterritorial jurisdiction where the alleged 
anticompetitive arrangement has a foreign element (or is wholly foreign) and has or is likely to have an 
‘appreciable adverse effect’ on an Indian market. Moreover, the amendment to the Act introduced in 2007 
provides for interim measures against imports contravening substantial provisions of the Act. See The 
Competition Act, No. 12 of 2003 (14 January 2003), as amended. Compare Shohit Chaudhry and Kartinkey 
Mahajan, 'The Case for an Effective Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of Competition Commission of India in Light of 
International Practices', 32 European Competition Law Review 314 (2011). 
118
 'US to Review Grant of GSP to India', Businessline, 31 January 2001. 
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Secretary of State, while the case was under appeal.
119
 As it has not been settled at the 
intergovernmental level, the USTR announced a review of the US Generalized System of 
Preferences (GSP) for India. The GSP provides for duty-free imports of defined goods and is 
designed to benefit developing countries. The review was intended to determine whether 
India offered 'equitable and reasonable market access for US goods and services’ and could 
have ended with the withdrawal of the preferences.
120
 Media estimated that the value of the 
GSP benefits at a couple of hundred million dollars.
121
 At that point the Indian import duties 
on soda ash were 35 per cent, despite the rate agreed within the WTO framework was 40 
per cent.
122
 The pressure of the US government on India was such, that the Indian 
government further lowered custom duties on soda ash down to 20 per cent and removed a 
previously applicable surcharge of 10 per cent.
123
 After the case was decided by the Supreme 
Court, whose interpretation prohibited extraterritorial application of Indian competition law 
in that context, the Office of the USTR considered the positive outcome of the legal dispute 
the result of its actions.
124
 India, an important developing country with a significant market, 
seems to have yielded to US political pressure and economic threat.  
The Indian ANSAC case suggests that countries introducing or reforming their 
competition laws should explicitly provide for extraterritorial application of their antitrust 
laws. Moreover, this case illustrates that when an international legal framework is lacking, 
political and economic power matter. This case shows that while the area of transnational 
anticompetitive conduct remains internationally unaddressed, the matter may be dealt with in 
                                                          
119
 'Ansac Issue Still Hangs After Key US-India Meeting', Chemical Business Newsbase, 31 March 2000. 
120
 US to Review Grant of GSP to India, above n 118, 
121
 'India files Response to US Fed Register Notice', Businessline, 22 February 2001. 
122
 'Withdrawal of Duty-Free Treatment to Soda Ash: India files Response to US Federal Register Notice', 
Chemical Business Newsbase, 2 March 2001. 
123
 'Soda Ash: An Unkind Cut', Businessline, 4 March 2001. 
124
 Broadbent, Assistant US Trade Representative in its statement before the Senate Subcommittee noted ‘One 
success story is the case where ANSAC was blocked from exporting to India after an accusation of 
anticompetitive practices. After close consultations with you and others in Congress, Ambassador Zoellick 
intervened repeatedly with the Indian government to ensure that U.S. exporters were treated in a transparent and 
fair manner. As a result, the allegation was overturned by the Indian Supreme Court in 2002. U.S. soda ash 
exporters have since had the opportunity to sell to this important growing market restored.’ 'International Trade 
and the Impact on the US Soda Ash Industry’, Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Trade of the 
Committee of Finance, US Senate, 15 April 2004, HRG 108-527, available at 
http://finance.senate.gov/library/hearings/download/?id=f0148a8a-1c78-4e76-9776-485ffbf2ec7a (visited 7 
January 2012). At the same time it should be clarified that the US government does not intervene each time 
when a US export cartel is challenged abroad. The relevant provisions providing for export cartels in the US 
make it crystal clear that they afford, under certain circumstances, immunity only from the US antitrust law. The 
prime example of a US export cartel challenged abroad without the US administration getting involved is Wood 
Pulp. See Joined Cases 89, 104, 114, 116, 117 and 125 to 129/85, A. Ahlström Osakeyhtiö and others v. 
Commission of the European Communities (Wood Pulp), [1988] ECR 5193. Compare Dieter G. F. Lange and 
John Byron Sandage, 'The Wood Pulp Decision and its Implications for the Scope of EC Competition Law', 26 
Common Market Law Reivew 137 (1989). 
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the political arena as a trade matter, outside the scope of competition law, or any of the 
existing multilateral regimes. 
2. The South African case: enforcement success story  
The case concerned ANSAC imports to South Africa. It was brought in 1999 by Botash, 
a Botswanian producer of soda ash, with its Southern African distributor,
 125
 who complained 
to the Southern African competition authority- the Competition Commission,
126
 accusing 
ANSAC of fixing prices of its exports to South Africa (SA) and market allocation. Unlike the 
situation in the Indian case, ANSAC was already present on this market when the allegations 
were brought. The Commission after its investigation referred the case to the Competition 
Tribunal.  
The possibility of an extraterritorial application of the reach of the SA competition 
law
127
 was itself not challenged. The disagreement concerned the precise extent of its 
reach.
128
 Section 3(1) of the Competition Act provides for jurisdiction over ‘all economic 
activity within, or having an effect within’ the SA. ANSAC argued that this provision allows 
the court to assume jurisdiction only when an anticompetitive, ‘deleterious’ effects has been 
established. It further argued that only the net effect of the challenged conduct should be 
taken into consideration, requiring therefore an analysis of both the anti- and procompetitive 
effects.
129
 From an ANSAC perspective this issue was important as price-fixing is per se 
prohibited under Section 4(1)(b) of the Act. The Tribunal did not share this line of argument, 
considering the wording of Section 3(1) clear and neutral. The court’s jurisdiction is assumed 
when the evidence of ‘effects’ is established, without investigation into their nature.130 This 
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 Note: Botswana and South Africa are members of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), which is 
the world’s oldest custom union. It has five members: the Republic of South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, 
Swaziland and Namibia. For more information about SACU see http://www.sacu.int/ (visited 7 January 2012). 
126
 The Southern African competition law regime is composed of three independent bodies: the Competition 
Commission, acting as an investigating body; the Competition Tribunal, the adjudicating body, and the 
Competition Appeal Court, hearing appeals from the Competition Tribunal. More on this issue see Trudi 
Hartzenberg, 'Competition Policy and Practice in South Africa: Promoting Competition for Development', 26 
Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business 667 (2006). 
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 Competition Act, No. 89 of 1998, Gov. Gazette Vol. 400, No. 19412 (30 October 1998), as amended. For the 
consolidated version of the Act, indicating changes see http://www.compcom.co.za/assets/Files/pocket-book-
2005-R.pdf (visited 7 January 2012). The Act was further amended in 2009, see Competition Amendment Act, 
No. 1 of 2009, Gov. Gazette Vol. 530, No. 32533 (28 August 2009). 
128
 Reasons and Order of the Competition Tribunal of 30 November 2001, Competition Comission v. American 
Natural Soda Ash Corp (Soda Ash), Cases 49/CR/Apr00 and 87/CR/Sep00, 4.  
129
 Ibid, at 6. 
130
 Ibid, at 29. 
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decision was upheld on appeal.
131
 ANSAC sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of 
Appeal of South Africa (SCA). This was the first such an appeal in the SA.
132
 The SCA 
agreed with lower courts in interpreting Section 3(1) as providing for jurisdiction based on all 
kinds of effects, not only these adverse.
133
  
The hearing before the Competition Tribunal took place in June 2008 and the closing 
arguments were scheduled for November 2008, but beforehand ANSAC contacted the 
Commission in order to discuss a settlement. It decided to withdraw from the SA market and, 
for the purpose of avoiding future litigation, it was willing to admit a contravention of the 
Act. Both sides agreed on the terms, the settlement was signed and subsequently confirmed 
by a court order.
134
 ANSAC agreed to make no further sales to the SA and to change its 
agreement to allow its members to sell individually in the SA, and not to in any way 
influence its members not to do so.
135
 Moreover, it agreed to pay a penalty representing 
eight per cent of soda ash annual turnover in the SA.
136
 Therefore the nine-year-long saga of 
soda ash proceedings, or as Justice Madlanga put it ‘a Methuselah of proceedings’137 ended. 
In a press release after the settlement ANSAC explained its decision to withdraw by 
observing that the costs and regulatory difficulties of serving the market made it 
comparatively less attractive.
138
 This may also explain why ANSAC did not seek alternative 
solutions through the US Trade Representative.  
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 American Natural Soda Ash Corp v. Competition Comission (Soda Ash- the Competition Appeal Court), 
Case 12/CAC/DEC01 (The Competition Appeals Court of South Africa 2003). 
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 In fact, before the appeal in the Competition Appeal Court took place, ANSAC had already sought an appeal 
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delivered its opinion. American Natural Soda Ash Corp v. Competition Comission (Soda Ash- the Supreme 
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determination in particular cases. Ibid, at paras 56-57, 60. For the broader discussion in this context see Kasturi 
Moodaliyar and Keith Weeks, 'Characterising Price Fixing: A Journey Through the Looking Glass with 
ANSAC', 11 South African Journal of Economic and Management Sciences 337 (2008). 
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 Order of the Competition Tribunal Confirming the Settlement Agreement of 4 November 2008, Competition 
Comission v. American Natural Soda Ash Corp (Soda Ash), Case 49/CR/Apr00. 
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 Ibid, at para. 6.1 of the Settlement. 
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 Ibid, at para. 7.1 of the Settlement. 
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 Reasons and Oder of the Competition Tribunal of 13 August 2008, American Natural Soda Ash Corp v. 
Competition Comission (Soda Ash), Case 49/CR/Apr00, para. 1. Methuselah is a biblical character who lived 
nine hundred sixty nine years.  
138
 ANSAC, 'ANSAC Reaches Settlement in South Africa', 4 November 2008. 
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Despite the assurances of the President of ANSAC in his testimony in this case that it 
would not happen,
139
 some of ANSAC members after its withdrawal kept supplying market 
on their own.
140
 Looking at the levels of soda ash export from the US to the South Africa (see 
the chart below),
 
it may be argued that the litigation had a negative impact in the short-term. 
A significant drop in US exports took place in 2002, the Competition Tribunal having issued 
orders against ANSAC in 2001. Still, the levels of exports increased steadily in the following 
years, reaching very high levels. In fact 2010 seems to be the best year in fifteen years from 
the perspective of exported quantities. At the same time these raw numbers need to be read 
with caution as they reflect the whole business environment as such, and not only the impact 
of the litigation. In any case it seems that from the supply side, the withdrawal of ANSAC not 
only did not affect market negatively in the medium-term, but actually improved the supply. 
 
Source: US Department of the Interior and US Geological Survey, available at  
http://minerals.er.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/soda_ash/ (visited 7 January 2012). 
It is also worth noting that the when ANSAC was found in breach of EU competition 
law in 1990,
141
 its members established the American-European Soda Ash Shipping 
Association (AESSA). This new entity, although also registered as an export cartel under the 
Webb-Pomerene Act, coordinates only logistics-related activities, such as shipping and 
storage, allowing its members achieve economies of scale while remaining in line with the 
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 Witness Statement of John M. Andrews, American Natural Soda Ash Corp v. Competition Comission (Soda 
Ash), Case 49/CR/Apr00, paras 59, 66-67. 
140
 For example FMC Wyoming Corporation and, more recently, Solvay operate in the South Africa, with FMC 
responsible for majority of the export to the SA. For more information see http://www.fmc.com/ and 
http://www.solvay.com/ (visited 7 January 2012). Solvay in fact left ANSAC in 2008. Compare Solvay, 'First 
Successful Export Shipments from the US', 31 January 2011, available at 
http://www.solvaychemicals.com/EN/News/Export_USA.aspx (visited 7 January 2012). 
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 European Commission, above n 100. 
84 
112 
164 
102 100 
84 
76 
61 
32 
66 
44 50 
70 
84 
93 
82 
162 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
US Exports of Soda Ash to the South Africa 
(in thousand metric tons) 
24 
 
EU competition law.
142
 It is possible that the relative lack of importance of the SA market to 
ANSAC meant its members were not interested in a similar solution in this case. One should 
note that while the case was ongoing, for nine years, as there was no injunction in force 
ANSAC kept exporting to the SA and its members were bound by the agreement not to sell 
individually.  
For a thorough assessment of the effect of the cartel on prices a comprehensive 
analysis of price levels of soda ash would be necessary. Such exercise lies beyond the scope 
of this paper, yet a general perspective may be offered. Was soda ash any less or more 
expensive after ANSAC left the market? If one looks only at the US export prices (free 
alongside ship) to the SA, then the drop is visible (see the chart below). In 2010 the price 
dropped down to the level noted only once in the last fifteen years. Furthermore, when 
compared with US export prices to Belgium (where ANSAC was not operating
143
) and to 
Argentina (where ANSAC is present), both importing from the US more soda ash on average 
than SA,
144
 it is clear that in the period 1996-2010 Argentinean prices were generally higher 
than export values to SA, and that this gap widened significantly in the last few years. In case 
of comparison of the US export values to Belgium/SA it is interesting to note similar changes 
since 2007. Moreover, in 2009 US export prices to the SA where only slightly higher (four 
per cent), while in 2010 they were twelve per cent lower than US export prices to Belgium. 
Furthermore, from 1996 until 2006 the US export price to the SA was generally higher than 
the average US export price, while since 2007 the relation changed and the US export price to 
the SA in each year was becoming lower as compared to the average US export price. 
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 Dennis S. Kostick, '2008 Minerals Yearbook: Soda Ash', US Department of the Interior, US Geological 
Survey, 2008, available at http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/soda_ash/myb1-2008-sodaa.pdf 
(visited 7 January 2012). 
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 See above text accompanying note 141.  
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Source: US Department of the Interior and US Geological Survey, available at  
http://minerals.er.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/soda_ash/ (visited 7 January 2012). 
One can also look at the difference between the US export price to the SA (which 
includes the transportation and insurance costs) and the average annual value of the soda ash 
in the US. The latter is not a price ‘but rather the value of the combined revenue of California 
and Wyoming bulk, dense soda ash sold on an f.o.b. plant basis at list, spot, or discount 
prices, on long-term contracts, and for export, divided by the quantity of soda ash sold’.145 It 
yet may serve as a proxy, even if imperfect, for the sake of the illustration of the price 
relationship (see the chart below). It clearly shows a stable difference persisted for about ten 
years, yet from 2007 onwards this difference was much smaller, to finally be negative in 
2010. In other words in 2010 the US export price to the SA, f.a.s. (free alongside ship), was 
about 16 dollars lower than the average value of the soda ash sold by the US producers, f.o.b. 
(free on board). This trend was similar in case of US export prices to Belgium, while the 
difference between the US export price to Argentina and the average value in the US 
remained considerable. 
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 Kostick, above n 142, at 70.2. 
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Source: US Department of the Interior and US Geological Survey, available at 
http://minerals.er.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/soda_ash/ (visited 7 January 2012). 
This broad comparison allows us to infer that the (extraterritorial) application of the 
SA competition law led to both better supply and most likely lower prices. The years to come 
will allow for better assessment in terms of the effect on prices, but the extraterritorial reach 
of the SA competition law was itself confirmed in practice. The competition authority proved 
it has the necessary capacity to actively enforce competition law. These are the marks of a 
success in the area of antitrust law enforcement. This case shows that competition regimes, in 
principle, when equipped with statutory provisions allowing for extraterritoriality, and when 
not hindered by internal or external political pressure, are able to unilaterally successfully 
challenge foreign export cartels. 
B. Chinese export cartels 
In the last few years on a number of occasions antitrust actions were brought against Chinese 
export cartels affecting US markets. In all these cases Chinese authorities are directly 
involved or at least implicated, and the defendants are in most cases state-owned 
enterprises.
146
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 For the potential consequences of state involvement in anticompetitive conduct in general see above text 
accompanying notes 91-93. For a more detailed analysis of these cases in the context of reliance on the foreign 
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These antitrust challenges are embroiled in a broader issue of the unclear interface 
between trade regulation and competition regimes. Fox and Davis
147
 note that China, in 
general, is faced with various antidumping actions brought, for example, by the US. The 
antidumping rules allow, in case of non-market economies, to come up with a ‘like’ price, for 
the sake of determination of dumping, by adopting costs structures from more developed 
market economies.
148
 This makes it relatively easy to establish dumping. The Chinese 
government in response to antidumping challenges introduced various measures addressing 
this issue. The price regulation by trade associations, usually supervised by the government, 
was one of them.
149
 Although addressing the dumping issue, this creates anticompetitive 
challenges. In effect private antitrust actions are being brought in the US for price-fixing of 
Chinese exports. Fox and Davis note the irony: the US are able to bring antidumping actions 
against China, when Chinese firms export goods at low prices (even when such prices reflect 
the real local costs
150
), and when the Chinese government puts in place a regulatory 
framework to avoid such challenges, Chinese firms may be sued in antitrust actions for fixing 
prices.
151
 Fox and Davis note that ‘China can do what is necessary to formally insulate its 
responsive prices as an act of state or as sovereign compulsion’ raising at the same time the 
issue of whether China should have to do so.
152
 While acknowledging this wider context, this 
section looks at these Chinese export cartels cases from the perspective of competition law. 
1. Recent anitrust Challenges 
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In Vitamin C
153
 four Chinese manufacturer of vitamin C and their trade association were 
accused by US purchasers of price-fixing and limiting exports. They did not deny the 
allegations, but instead brought a motion to dismiss the case based on the doctrines of foreign 
sovereign compulsion, the act of state and international comity.
154
 The defences rested on the 
issue of Chinese government involvement: whether it required the defendants to fix prices.
155
 
At that early stage the court found the evidence too ambiguous and denied the defendants’ 
motion.
156
 
In this case the Chinese government submitted its first ever amicus in front of a US 
court.
157
 In its brief the Chinese ministry argued that the trade association was in fact the 
Chamber of Commerce, under its direct and active supervision, performing governmental 
functions authorized under Chinese law. Earlier on Chinese authorities issued a notice 
requiring strict control of vitamin C production, which led to establishment of the special 
body, in the Chamber, dealing with this issue. Only its members had the right to export 
vitamin C and the charter obliged them to ‘voluntarily adjust their production outputs’ and to 
‘strictly execute [an] export coordinated price set by the Chamber and [to] keep it 
confidential.’ There was also a system of sanctions in place, including revocation of the 
membership or even an indirect threat of a cancellation of the export license. Against this 
backdrop, the defendants, supported by the Chinese authorities, argued that they were 
compelled under Chinese law, and although the ministry itself did not set prices, they were 
unable to export at a non-conforming price.
158
 The court concluded that although such a brief 
was entitled to ‘substantial deference’, it was not to be regarded as conclusive. This was 
particularly so in the instant case, where the documentary evidence provided by the plaintiffs 
directly contradicted the brief’s position.159 
The plaintiffs claimed there was no single law or regulation forcing a particular price 
or price agreement at issue. Furthermore, there was evidence showing that the defendants 
were setting prices themselves by hand voting. In addition, it was argued that defendants set 
the minimum price, but at the same time undercut each other.
160
 This evidence pointed out to 
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a complex relationship between the Chinese companies and the Chamber, making it difficult 
to determine the degree of their independence with regard to prices.
161
 
Due to the non-transparent Chinese legal system, frequently relying on administrative 
instructions, it was unclear ‘whether defendants were performing a government function, 
whether they were acting as private citizens pursuant to governmental directives or whether 
they were acting as unrestrained private citizens’.162 In addition, the court noted that a 
scenario where the defendants formed the cartel and only then asked for the state recognition 
was also conceivable. Finally the court considered the records too ambiguous ‘to foreclose 
further inquiry into the voluntariness of defendants' actions’ at that stage and the motion to 
dismiss on the basis of the state-related avoidance techniques was dismissed.
163
 
In the most recent decision in this case, of September 2011, the district court denied 
the defendants a motion for summary judgment based on the foreign compulsion defence.
164
 
Although it found the doctrine generally applicable when a party finds itself ‘between the 
rock of its own local law and the hard place of U.S. law’, but it found ‘no rock and no hard 
place’, in the case at stake.165  
It became known that the Chinese regulatory framework changed considerably within 
the considered period (December 2001-December 2008; significant changes- so-called ‘self-
discipline’ system- were introduced in 2002). The membership in the Chamber’s special body 
stopped being a prerequisite to receive an export right.
166
 It transpired that there were no 
penalties for failing to follow the new ‘self-discipline’ system.167 Furthermore, it was 
established that on one occasion, under the changed regime, one of the cartel members 
refused to partake in a production stoppage proposed by the other members. As a general 
manager of the other cartel member commented, it ‘unilaterally tore[d] up the agreement [on 
the shutdown]’.168 At the next such attempt, the earlier deflecting member participated, but 
prospects thereof were described as ‘not great’.169 While the defendants argued that the 
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company was penalized for its behavior and required to participate in the second shutdown, 
the documentary evidence did not support these claims.
170
 
It is noteworthy that the court in Vitamin C did not rely on the Chinese authorities 
interpretation of Chinese law, especially its 2009 statement.
171
 In its opinion it did not ‘read 
like a frank and straightforward explanation of Chinese law’ but rather ‘a carefully crafted 
and phrased litigation position.’172 Moreover, the submitted position was contradicted by the 
factual record
173
 as well as by China’s representations to the WTO.174 Overall, the court 
considered the Chinese support ‘a post-hoc attempt to shield defendants' conduct from 
antitrust scrutiny.’175 
The court also referred to the related and then pending WTO trade dispute, where it 
was argued that China by introduction of minimum price requirements for certain raw 
materials violated its obligations.
176
 In this case, the Panel found in favour of the US, noting 
that actions undertaken by the relevant chamber of commerce were attributable to China
177
 
(on appeal the Appellate Body, on procedural grounds, declared these findings moot and of 
no legal effect).
178
 The court in Vitamin C did not find its interpretations of Chinese law 
altered by the WTO Panel’s findings. The only measure possibly indicating compulsion 
concerned the minimum price requirements put in place to avoid the anti-dumping challenges 
and it was not relied upon by the Chinese authorities to establish compulsion in the case at 
stake.
180
 
In a similar vein in Animal Science
 181
 US plaintiffs brought a class action against a 
number of Chinese companies exporting magnesite-based products to the US for the alleged 
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price-fixing. The defendants brought a motion to dismiss, invoking state-related defences: act 
of state doctrine, the foreign state compulsion, and also comity considerations.
182
  
In Animal Science the court faced a very similar issue to the one in Vitamin C case. 
The Chamber of Commerce, a ‘governmental appendage’183 empowered to administer the 
export licenses, was involved in setting the minimum prices for the exported products. There 
was also a threat of severe punishment in place in case of non-compliance.
184
 In this case the 
court found that government compulsion lasted for a long time and was achieved not by a 
particular act, but was rather created by a legal regime, employing ‘various regulatory 
mechanisms producing a composite effect of a never-ceasing correlation between the 
minimum price requirement and punitive measures for non-compliance with it’.185 It was 
established that the Chinese government compelled the defendants, and forced upon them ‘a’ 
minimum price.
186
 Yet the court noted that if the actual price figures were never set, or set but 
left unknown to the defendants and to the authorities enforcing the minimum price 
requirement,
187
 then any price-fixing agreement is to be treated as a private one, outside the 
realm of sovereign defences. Similarly, if the prices were known to the defendants, it is still 
possible that they have entered into supra-minimum price agreements. In such a case, these 
agreements could be illegal under US antitrust, irrespective of whether the Chinese 
authorities had the right to enforce them.
188
 The district court dismissed the complaint after 
finding that the plaintiffs failed to establish court subject-matter jurisdiction. Leave to amend 
the complaint was granted,
189
 but the plaintiffs declined this and appealed. The Third Circuit 
                                                          
182
 The action was originally brought in 2005, but the first two years of the litigation concerned the matter 
related to the service of process. In 2008 the case was reassigned and further proceedings took place, the 
complaint was repleaded, finally leading to the discussed court’s opinion. 
183
 Animal Science, above n 181, at 78. 
184
 Ibid, at 80. 
185
 Ibid, at 87. 
186
 Ibid, at 95. 
187
 The court has established that the Chinese government compelled the defendants and forces upon them ‘a’ 
minimum price. Yet it is still possible that the factual price- ‘the’ price- was in fact never set by the government 
(therefore ‘the price’ equals zero), or that it was set, but never communicated to the defendants (therefore, again, 
‘the price’ equals zero). In any of such cases, any agreements among the defendants fixing the price on any level 
would not allow defendants to rely on the sovereign compulsion defence.  
188
 Animal Science, above n 181, at 96. 
189
 The complaint was dismissed (a) with prejudice with regard to the claims based on the ‘effects’ exception to 
the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act (the ‘jurisdictional bar’ requiring the direct, substantial, and 
reasonably foreseeable effect on US commerce was not met by the plaintiffs); (b) without prejudice to claims 
invoking court jurisdiction under the introductory clause of the FTAIA (making the FTAIA ‘jurisdictional bar’ 
inapplicable in cases where defendants are importers). Ibid, at 362-63, 83. 
32 
 
vacated the district court decision on jurisdictional issues and the case was remanded for 
further proceedings on merits.
190
 
The district court in Animal Science, compared to Vitamin C, was much more 
thoughtful about the nature of the Chinese regulatory regime. This is a welcome 
development. It remains to be seen how the court addresses the issue of foreign sovereign 
compulsion defence, especially in light of the intervening opinion in Vitamin C.  
Similarly to Vitamin C and Animal Science, in Resco
191
 a complaint was brought by a 
US firm against Chinese defendants for their alleged price-fixing of exports of bauxite. The 
facts are similar to those in the other two cases, as are the arguments of the defense, the core 
being the invocation of foreign sovereign compulsion. In this case the proceedings were 
stayed in the anticipation of the outcome of the proceedings brought by the US against China 
within the WTO dispute settlement framework concerning China’s export restrictions on 
various raw materials, including bauxite. One of the measures complained of by the US is the 
very issue of price requirements.
192
 The US argued that those are the actions of the Chinese 
government, as the respondents in Resco claim. Although the decisions of the Dispute 
Settlement Body are not binding upon the court, the findings may at least simplify the 
analysis.  
The Panel report in this case was circulated to WTO members in July 2011.
193
 The 
Panel found only six measures related to minimum export price requirement within its frame 
of reference. These were the measures, such as charters or regulations of chambers of 
commerce which, as it was pointed out, were related to in the domestic antitrust proceedings 
in Vitamin C.
194
 The complainants alleged that China enforces minimum export prices 
through a system of ‘self-discipline’ underpinned by penalties imposed on non-comforting 
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exporters as well as penalties imposed on authorities granting licenses to non-comforting 
exporters.
195
 In this regard references were made to all the above mentioned pending 
domestic antitrust proceedings (Vitamin C, Animal Science, Resco).
196
 The measures were 
found attributable to China,
197
 and of a type that may be challenged under Article XI:I 
GATT.
198
 Although China argued that the export price control was repealed in 2010, the 
Panel looked at the measures that were in force when it was established (December 2009). It 
agreed with the approach followed in Japan- Trade in Semiconductors and it considered the 
authority to determine the export prices and require exporters to adhere to them, under the 
thread of strict penalties or export license revocation, as potentially trade restrictive and 
found ‘the very potential to limit trade’ [emphasis in the original] sufficient to constitute a 
restriction prohibited under Article XI:1.
199
 Thereby China was found in violation of its WTO 
obligations. China appealed the findings.
200
  
The Appellate Body in its recent report
202
 found that the Panel erred in finding that 
allegations contained in the section III of the panel requests (including those concerning 
minimal price requirements) met the requirements of Article 6.2 of the Understanding on 
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes.
203
 In the AB view the 
complainants in their panel requests failed to ‘provide sufficiently clear linkages between the 
broad range of obligations [referred to] and the 37 challenged measures.’204 Consequently, on 
these procedural grounds the AB declared ‘moot and of no legal effect’ the earlier Panel’s 
findings in relation to claims raised under section III of the panel requests.
205
 It is 
disappointing that the Appellate Body did not offer its view on the interpretation of Article 
XI:I GATT and its applicability to state-driven export cartels. While the AB stripped the 
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earlier Panel report from its legal effects, the reasoning offered by the panellists reinforces a 
view advocating a greater role to be played by the trade regime in addressing transnational 
anticompetitive arrangements. 
The recent Chinese export cartel cases in general illustrate a clash of economic 
systems and legal frameworks. Within the broader trade context, as outlined by Fox and 
Davis,
206
 antidumping rules encouraged China to influence export prices, so as to avoid 
antidumping litigation (by increasing export prices China could avoid accusation of 
dumping). This is possible thanks to the Chinese economic system characterized by 
significant state involvement in the running of economy. The set prices are then challenged 
abroad under antitrust laws. Furthermore, as China- Measures Related to the Exportation of 
Various Raw Materials suggests, they can be also targeted in the trade framework. If such a 
route proves feasible in the future, it would bring new dynamics to the interface between the 
trade and competition, further narrowing down the existing gap allowing for export cartels, 
by recognizing prohibition of state-driven export cartels. 
From an antitrust perspective these cases,
207
 involving state-owned enterprises and 
considerable state involvement, pose a challenge for antitrust regimes. The successful 
reliance on the state-related defences may encourage more state-licensed export cartels, not 
only from China. Chinese support of export cartels already caused concerns. For example, 
Connor considered it ‘a disturbing trend’208 while another commentator bluntly characterized 
any successful reliance by Chinese cartelists on foreign state compulsion defence as ‘a 
declaration of war on the market system.’209 The next question will be raised: can one sue a 
state for antitrust violation? Until now this issue has not been answered in the positive by the 
courts or the legislature. The US government itself seems unwilling to follow this path: all 
above cases where brought by private plaintiffs and, as it appears, there is no such action 
brought by the Department of Justice. The answer in the negative would create a gap in the 
antitrust system, implicitly granting an antitrust immunity to anticompetitive foreign state 
action. If courts do not allow reliance on the mentioned avoidance techniques, or if one could 
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sue directly a state for antitrust violation, enforcement of the judgment will be the next 
practical and controversial issue to address. The US for example would not cooperate in the 
enforcement of a judgment against a legally operating and duly registered export cartel.  
Furthermore, it may be inferred from the China- Measures Related to the Exportation 
of Various Raw Materials trade dispute that by bringing the case against China within the 
WTO framework, the US seems to have opted for reliance on the multilateral system. The 
measures restricting imports or exports are prohibited within this framework. If creation or 
operation of an export cartel can be attributed to a state itself, the provisions of WTO 
agreements should be applicable as the Panel in this case suggested.
210
 This said, one should 
keep in mind that trade disputes exclude private parties, who do not have standing and cannot 
seek redress in the WTO dispute settlement framework. This has two consequences. First, 
any action against a foreign export cartel with state involvement would depend on the 
decision of the executive in the affected state, which most probably would take into 
consideration a broader spectrum of issues than just harm caused by cartel operations. 
Second, any issue would be settled among states and no damages would be available to 
private parties harmed.
211
 Moreover, the companies which benefited from export cartels 
operations would keep the extra profits they made as they would not be directly penalized, 
and, therefore, they would have a comparative advantage against companies in the same 
industry from other states.  
If the line of reasoning offered by the panel in the recent trade dispute was to be 
adopted in future, an issue would arise whether private plaintiffs could bring, in a follow-up, 
a piggyback antitrust action in the US against a foreign state, benefiting from the body of 
evidence analyzed within the WTO dispute settlement framework. Treble damages provide 
sufficient incentive to ask this question. This leads again to the question of enforcement 
against state-own enterprises or a foreign state itself. 
These cases show that the present regulatory regime in general and antitrust in 
particular are ill-equipped to address foreign-state involvement in export cartels either in 
China or in the US. This is particularly so, when the challenged state is a non-market 
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economy, like, but not only, China, with complicated internal decision-making structure, 
hampering the allocation of responsibility and consequently liability. Furthermore, the 
extralegal factors, in particular the political and security considerations may be of paramount 
importance in any attempted enforcement. In addition, it seems that the stance of the 
international trade regime is not clear. Taking into consideration developments in China- 
Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials, it seems likely that the trade 
regime proves capable of addressing export cartels with state involvement, but that may not 
be the optimal solution. 
2. Mind the US- Japanese Friction 
The Chinese cases raise somehow similar challenges to those posed by Japanese export 
cartels in 1970s. At that time Japanese exports were heavily cartelized: in 1977 there were 
eighty-six officially registered export cartels, accounting for 20-30 per cent of all 
exports.
212
Japanese legislation not only exempted them from the scope of national 
competition laws, but the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry could have 
either suggested creation of a cartel through non-binding administrative guidance, and when 
this proved insufficient, it had the capacity and intended to order creation of a cartel.
213
 In 
light of the Japanese domestic cases from that period, Matsushita concludes that the 
administrative guidance might have been regarded as an official act of the Japanese 
government.
214
 The economists had divergent options as to the competitive impact of the 
Japanese export cartels.
215
 The growing concern among the US businesses with the Japanese 
unfair business practices in general led to intergovernmental negotiations between the US and 
Japan,
216
 various antidumping cases and trade disputes,
217
 and effectively to a review of 
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Japanese competition law, with Japan committing itself not to use cartels as tools of the 
industrial policy.
218
  
In the landmark antitrust case from this period Matsushita,
219
 which made its way to 
the Supreme Court, US TV manufactures alleged that the Japanese TV manufactures created 
a cartel, applying predatory pricing on the US market, so as to drive US competitors out of 
the market. It was a duly registered export cartel under Japanese law. To afford the predation, 
it cartelized the domestic market where it charged supra-competitive prices. This case raised 
the issue of the foreign sovereign compulsion defence, although the Supreme Court itself did 
not address it, after finding that the alleged conduct did not injure the plaintiffs.
220
 The Court 
of Appeals found the compulsion defence inapplicable, noting inter alia that defendants 
departed from the minimum price set by the Japanese authorities and that the domestic part of 
the cartel violated Japanese laws. The court also concluded that the Japanese regulatory 
scheme ‘merely provided an umbrella’ allowing for the domestic antitrust exemption.221 The 
Japanese government in its amicus brief to the Supreme Court supported Japanese companies 
informing that it has directed them to organize the cartel and that it put in place the regulatory 
regime concerning prices.
222
 This position was supported by the US government.
223
 As 
Ganjaei points out,
 224
 the stance of the US government reflected the changes in its foreign 
policy and the agreements between the US and Japan according to which Japan adopted 
voluntary controls of car exports to the US,
225
 a measure which later was itself prohibited in 
the outcome of the Uruguay Round.
226
 The US- Japanese friction shows how the US was 
able, through its foreign and trade policies, to bilaterally address and influence foreign 
competition regime. 
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VI. Conclusion 
The creativity of the corporate world seems unlimited. There is no reason to believe that 
businesses around the world would refrain from taking advantage of the present regulatory 
system allowing for export cartels. The absence of empirical data should not lead to the 
conclusion that the issue is nonexistent. The unique treatment accorded to export cartels at 
the moment, as compared to other types of cartels, by their tolerance or encouragement, and 
the immunity from domestic antitrust laws, is not a beneficial policy in the long-run. 
The recent case law illustrates the deficiencies of the present regulatory framework. 
The lack of an international mechanism addressing export cartels forces targeted states to rely 
on extraterritorial application of national competition laws. In general this unilateral route, 
from a practical perspective, requires expertise and resources, which are scarce in many 
jurisdictions. As the Indian ANSAC case shows, the lack of an explicit legal basis in national 
legislation providing for extraterritoriality may hinder such actions. It also underlines that 
when binding international mechanisms in competition law are lacking, the matter will be 
addressed through trade policy when important economic interests are at stake. It suggests 
that it is in the best interest of the less powerful states who are interested in legal resolution of 
controversies arising from transnational anticompetitive conduct and who lack trade muscle, 
to work towards international consensus in this area. At the same time, the South African 
case shows that when competition law is free to take its course unobstructed, 
extraterritoriality may lead to positive outcomes and may be a useful tool in the fight with 
export cartels. It is noteworthy that both cases concerned the same officially registered and 
publicly known export cartel, which was earlier challenged in a developed competition law 
regime. This seems to be the only case of this nature. 
The Chinese/US cases, in general, point out that export cartels may come also from 
the global South. If this development becomes a larger phenomenon, it could, in principle, 
reframe the discussion on export cartels in terms of possible tradeoffs. Some economists 
suggested tying a general prohibition of export cartels in developed countries
227
 with market 
access concessions on behalf of and transfers from developing world as a form of 
reciprocation.
228
 Were export cartels to become more widespread in the global South, any 
such ‘package deal’ would require reconsideration. Moreover, the Chinese export cartel cases 
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show that government’s involvement in transnational anticompetitive conduct, like export 
cartels, poses a challenge to antitrust regimes. If the bulwark of sovereignty proves to provide 
a shelter in such scenarios, then there is a risk that state-protected export cartels become more 
prevalent, undermining not only the competition laws, but also the rules of international 
trade, by according entities engaged in such anticompetitive conduct a comparative 
advantage. This perspective may in fact incentivize international community to look for a 
solution to the issue of both private and public, state(s)-driven, export cartels. While it is 
unlikely to reach a compromise prohibiting public export cartels dealing with natural 
resources,
229
 this as such should not restrain us from placing them on the international agenda 
as well, looking for a mutually beneficial solution with an intention to tighten up the gaps in 
the current regulatory framework. 
The limits of unilateralism when dealing with export cartels lead to a conclusion that 
an international solution is needed. Soft forms of cooperation
230
 until now did not provide an 
answer to the challenge of export cartels, with the broadest forum- ICN- focusing its efforts 
on different antitrust issues. ICN could look at export cartels, but taking into consideration 
the de facto inseparable trade context and the relevance of antidumping rules, the WTO 
seems the right forum. It has many advantages, one of them being its almost universal 
membership. A broad international competition agreement, an idea which received attention 
of many commentators,
231
 seems unlikely in the medium term. A different, more realistic, 
solution is available. Fox suggested a limited approach: the ‘perfection’ of the existing 
commitments in the WTO framework,
232
 which through further clarification and compromise 
could adequately address the issue of export cartels. Although the interface of trade and 
competition does not have a glamorous past, it should not matter. Pragmatic thinking 
suggests that is the most efficient way forward. 
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In recent years competition laws were introduced in many jurisdictions and 
considerable effort was invested by the international community in competition advocacy and 
voluntary cooperation between competition authorities (best exemplified by the creation of 
the International Competition Network which now has more than 100 members), leading to 
more dialogue and understanding in this area of law. This led, for example, to international 
consensus on international private hard core cartels (but not export cartels) as harmful and 
actual cooperation in their pursuit across jurisdictions. Taking this into consideration, the 
time is perhaps ripe to come back to the discussion on export cartels and to revisit narrow-
focused proposals in this regard which could be introduced within the WTO framework. The 
one suggested by Sweeney seems particularly appealing: an agreement taking into account in 
antitrust investigations not only domestic, but also foreign harm caused by such cartels; 
reinforced by a positive comity (a commitment to investigate a particular case at the request 
of a foreign jurisdiction).
 233
 Such a regime could be adopted as a plurilateral agreement, 
preferably on the side and not within a major negotiation round, open to all interested 
jurisdictions and subject to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. Taking into 
consideration that China, as the discussed cases present, is caught between a rock of 
antidumping and a hard place of antitrust actions, it may be interested in such a solution. The 
US, on the other hand, facing now Chinese export cartels with considerable state involvement 
may find it worthwhile to sit down and negotiate as well so as to avoid similar but greater 
problems in the future. The European Union, which already within the framework of the 
WTO Woking Group took the view that the issue of export cartels should be addressed, 
would surely join the talks. While developing countries were quite sceptical about 
competition issues on the trade agenda, the Indian experience with the US soda ash export 
cartel, discussed above, shows that they may now find it in their best interests to work 
towards an international solution to export cartels, especially if approached outside the major 
round of trade negotiations.
 234
 In fact if the tipping point has not been reached yet, the recent 
developments allow hoping that it is not too far away and more thought should be now 
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invested into consideration of possible scenarios addressing export cartels, both private and 
public, reflecting the current challenges.
235
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